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ABSTRACT
Following the events surrounding September 11 th, many
categories of international law are being revisited. The jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court ("ICC") should be no exception.
This article argues that acts of international terrorism, such as those
perpetrated on September 1 th, qualify as crimes against humanity
under the Rome Statute. Mindful of the concept of complementarity
found under the statute, this article identifies several situations where
it would be desirable to grant the ICC jurisdiction over acts of
terrorism. The article first examines the jurisdiction of the ICC as it
currently stands, along with the reasons why state parties did not feel
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the need to include terrorism under ICC jurisdiction. Conversely, it
presents the view, held by various states and legal scholars, that
crimes of terrorism could be adjudicated on the international level.
The article then moves toward the concrete process of rethinking the
jurisdiction of the ICC so as to adapt to the modem war on terrorism.
Before engaging in legal analysis, this article references the ongoing
debate regarding adoption of an internationally-accepted definition
for terrorism. Taking into consideration the fact that a majority of
states share a common understanding of the minimal contents of
such a definition, the author provides a solution to that polemic. In
addition, this article briefly reviews the notion of crimes against
humanity so as to demonstrate a prima facie proximity or
compatibility between that infraction and acts analogous to those
perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda. Finally, the article culminates
with an analysis of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Before dissecting
every element found in that provision, the author surveys
jurisprudential elements of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR") that delineate the legal boundaries of crimes
against humanity. This project ultimately leads to a detailed analysis
of the requirements found under Article 7, and applies these
requirements to the acts perpetrated on September 11 th. In sum, the
position taken in this article is that the Rome Statute does not have to
be modified in order to characterize acts of terrorism as crimes
against humanity. Most importantly, it follows from this proposition
that where genuine national prosecutions prove illusory, the ICC
could assert jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism.
10112004]
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INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of neo-terrorism and the multiplication of
international crimes, the international community will have to
rethink some of the key elements found under the Rome Statute.1
Following the events of September 11 th, it would be useful for legal
scholars and practitioners to reconsider the jurisdiction of the ICC,
especially with regard to crimes against humanity.2 In doing so, those
scholars and practitioners should identify alternate avenues and
adjudicative bodies to national jurisdictions in order to thwart
efficiently the increasing threat of international terrorism.3 This
article compares the scope of Article 7 of the Rome Statute with the
concept of international terrorism, as most states understand it.4 This
article will ultimately gravitate towards a straightforward conclusion:
that the international community is not required to amend the Rome
Statute, as the crime of international terrorism undoubtedly falls
under ICC jurisdiction already. This interpretation is feasible
because Article 7, which deals with crimes against humanity, clearly
encompasses the concept of international terrorism. Thus, for reasons
I will detail in the following pages, it is necessary in some cases to
grant jurisdiction to the ICC over acts of international terrorism.
An obvious and inherent limitation to my proposal lies in the
principle of complementarity. In this regard, the general rule is that
the state exercising custody over an accused may initiate domestic
criminal proceedings against the individual.5 Under the aegis of the
Rome Conference, state parties to the Rome Statute clearly intended
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See YOUNG SOK KIM, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY OF THE ROME STATUTE 76 (2003) (noting that all states
participating in the drafting of the Rome Statute agreed that crimes against
humanity should fall under ICC jurisdiction).
3. See id. at 20 (commenting that, due to disagreements encountered when
drafting the Rome Statute, international terrorism does not fall under ICC
jurisdiction).
4. See id. at 83 (noting that no state opposed murder being defined as a crime
against humanity).
5. See id. (noting that a prosecutor before the ICC is encouraged to be
attentive to the interests of a broad international audience).
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to subordinate the jurisdiction of the ICC to the national prosecution
of criminal acts.6 In other words, the ICC will not adjudicate a crime
enumerated in its Statute unless the "national authorities are
'unwilling or unable' to carry out a genuine investigation and, if
appropriate, prosecution."7  Cognizant of this spirit of
complementarity, I recognize that the ICC should only act as an
adjudicative body of "last resort," where genuine national
proceedings prove illusory.8 However, it is still necessary to
acknowledge the jurisdiction of the ICC over international terrorism,
as several specific situations warrant the involvement of an
international tribunal like the ICC, such as state passiveness,
inaction, or impunity.9
6. See id. at 219 ("[T]he Statute now requires the acceptance of either the
state of nationality of the accused or the state in whose territory the crime was
committed before the Court can exercise jurisdiction.").
7. Kenneth Roth, The Court the US Doesn't Want, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1195, 1195 (Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston eds., 2000).
In favor of the [International Criminal] court were most of America's closest
allies, including Britain, Canada, and Germany. But the United States was
isolated in opposition, along with such dictatorships and enemies of human
rights as Iran, Iraq, China, Libya, Algeria, and Sudan... The Clinton
administration's opposition to the ICC stemmed in part from its fear, a
plausible one, that hostile states like Cuba, Libya, or Iraq might try to
convince the court to launch a frivolous or politically motivated prosecution
of US soldiers or commanding officers. The Rome delegates adopted several
safeguards against this possibility, most importantly the so-called principle of
complementarity... the complementarity principle also reflects the widely
shared view that systems of national justice should remain the front-line
defense against serious human rights abuses, with the ICC serving only as a
backstop.., if an American soldier were to commit a serious war crime-say,
by deliberately massacring civilians-he could be brought before the ICC only
if the US government failed to pursue his case. Indeed, even a national
decision not to prosecute must be respected so long as it is not a bad faith
effort to shield a criminal from justice. Because of the strength of the US
judicial system, an ICC prosecutor would have a hard time dismissing a US
investigation or prosecution as a sham.
Id.
8. Cf id. (commenting that the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals have the right
to supercede national courts).
9. See id. (explaining that a primary purpose of the ICC is to prosecute
criminals that have only faced sham or illusory prosecutions before national
courts).
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The inclusion of terrorism under ICC jurisdiction is well-founded
for several reasons. More generally, it would undoubtedly serve a
stabilizing purpose between two competing interests. On the one
hand, given the current efforts being deployed in the field of counter-
terrorism, many states wish to prosecute foreigners for terrorist acts
perpetrated on their soil."0 On the other hand, states also want to
protect and shelter their own nationals from terrorist attacks. In the
latter scenario, those states often express the view that they
themselves should exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed
against their own civilians, regardless of the location of the
perpetration.I' In order to resolve this tension, referring such matters
to the ICC would definitely constitute a reasonable compromise. 2
This solution is far from ideal, but when addressing politically
sensitive issues like the prosecution of international terrorists,
mitigation of jurisdictional conflicts is a noble objective.
Moving from general considerations to a concrete implementation
of my proposed model, I have identified at least five situations where
the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over acts of international
terrorism. First, I invoke the Lockerbie situation.'3 In the famous
Lockerbie decision, two Libyan nationals were accused of
participating in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, in which a
number of American nationals were killed. 14 Following a United
States Grand Jury indictment, the Libyan government categorically
refused to extradite its nationals, as it argued that the United States
was trying to curtail its obligations under the Convention for the
10. See KIM, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that the crime of terrorism was listed
as a treaty crime; other treaty crimes include drug trafficking and crimes against
U.N. personnel).
11. See Roth, supra note 7 (highlighting that the United States is particularly
unwilling to allow an international tribunal to try its citizens).
12. See id. (emphasizing that the ICC is meant to be a court of last resort).
13. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (April 14, 1992) [hereinafter
Lockerbie] (detailing the events surrounding the bombing of a commercial airline
flight over Scotland).
14. See id. at 4 (explaining that the primary issue of in the case was application
of the Montreal Convention).
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Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. 5
According to Libya, the United States seemed more interested in
recovering the culprits and preventing Libya from establishing
jurisdiction than in fulfilling their treaty obligations. 6 Once again,
this case raised an interesting tension between two crucial concepts:
trust and impunity. From the Libyan perspective, it was uncertain
what treatment the United States would afford to the suspected
terrorists. 7 Consequently, Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi did not
trust the United States to prosecute nationals from his country."
From the American perspective, impunity remained the dominant
concern.19 Should the suspected terrorists dodge extradition to the
United States, there would be a significant risk that those individuals
would face national sanctions disproportionate to the crimes
committed or, worse yet, no punishment at all.20 Such situations
usually result in a jurisdictional impasse and threats of economic
reprisals from the economically more powerful state, as was the case
in Lockerbie.
Thus, referral of the matter to an independent international
tribunal like the ICC might have been the proper response to the
Lockerbie dilemma. This sort of ad hoc arrangement may also prove
useful in other Lockerbie-like situations, namely where two
15. See id. at 5 (listing some of the provisions of the Montreal Convention,
which includes mechanisms allowing states to prosecute their own nationals for
crimes committed against civil aviation).
16. See id. at 11 (noting that the United States joined with the United Kingdom
in strongly deploring the Libyan government for not taking effective measures to
prevent terrorism).
17. See id. at 13 (commenting on the U.N. Security Council resolution calling
for Libya to cease participation with all forms of terrorist activity).
18. See Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. at 5 (noting that there is no extradition treaty
between the United Kingdom and Libya, and that Libyan law prohibits the
extradition of Libyan nationals).
19. See id. at 10 (detailing that the United States joined the United Kingdom in
a joint declaration demanding Libya hand over the men suspected of bombing Pan
Am Flight 103)
20. See Eric Zubel, The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension Between the
International Court of Justice and the Security Council, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 259, 260 (1999) (commenting on the outcry from the Western press
calling for the accused to be brought before U.S. and Scottish courts).
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governments are deadlocked over the surrender of suspected
terrorists.21
Second, a human rights/due process perspective warrants
consideration. This approach is analogous to the analysis presented
in the first scenario, as it also pertains to the level of trust a state
exercising custody might have vis-d-vis the state requesting
extradition.22 In the Lockerbie case, Libyan leader Ghaddafi clearly
did not trust that the judiciary of the United States or the United
Kingdom could afford the suspected terrorists an impartial hearing. 3
In addition to red-flagging significant due process concerns, Libya
was of the view that the accused were actually considered guilty
until proven innocent, contrary to the usual presumption in criminal
law. 4 As a result, Libya harbored doubts that the United States
would afford a fair trial to these individuals.25
It is no secret that governments have been under public scrutiny
for curtailing fundamental rights in their efforts to suppress
terrorism.26 Once again, in a situation where a government does not
believe that its nationals will receive the full benefit of procedural
and human rights guarantees, referring the matter to the ICC would
be a reasonable middle ground. However, the direct effect of such a
model is clear: it reduces the powers of national police and security
forces to interrogate and detain suspected terrorists.
21. See id. at 265 (emphasizing that the Lockerbie incident was not the only
time that Libya and the United States have been deadlocked over an extradition
matter involving suspected terrorists).
22. See id. (highlighting Libya's distrust of the United States in seeking a
settlement of their dispute due to the Berlin nightclub bombing incident).
23. See id. at 261 (noting the huge outcry against this particular bombing, and
suggesting that it is not surprising that impartiality might come into question).
24. See id. (quoting George J. Church in Time magazine, who posed the
question, "how can [Ghaddafi] and his regime be punished?" which implies that
they were presumed guilty).
25. See Zubel, supra note 20 at 265 (reiterating Libya's reservations in dealing
with the United States after it bombed Libya's capital city, military installations,
and airports following the Berlin nightclub bombing).
26. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(stating that some detainees in Guantanamo Bay are not entitled to due process).
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Third, it is imperative to mention the Yunis situation.27 In some
cases, governments resort to "forcible abduction" of suspected
terrorists as the only means to bring them to trial, where other
avenues have failed.28 In the Yunis case, the appellant was accused of
spearheading a complex airplane hijacking and hostage-taking. 29 As
the facts of the case reveal, in order to secure custody of the suspect,
FBI agents concocted an elaborate scheme labeled "Operation
Goldenrod:" "[u]ndercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a yacht in
the eastern Mediterranean Sea with promises of a drug deal, and
arrested him once the vessel entered international waters."3 These
types of "buy/bust" operations are becoming commonplace in the
fight against terrorism.31
From the perspective of international law, or law and order more
generally, the prospect of deploying bounty hunters or trying to track
down terrorists by any means necessary-irrespective of the legal
repercussions involved-is clearly not a desirable situation.32
Finding a basis for alternate jurisdiction before the ICC would
regularize these types of situations.33 It is important to reiterate that a
recalcitrant state, such as Libya in the Lockerbie situation, may be
27. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
28. See id at 1089 (detailing how undercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a
yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with promises of a drug deal and arrested
him once the vessel entered international waters, then transferred him to a Navy
munitions ship for interrogation); see also North Media Jersey Group, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Court confirms its
inability "to conclude that openness plays a positive role in special interest
deportation hearings at a time when my nation is faced with threats of such
profound and unknown dimension").
29. See Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089 (detailing the circumstances surrounding the
hijacking of Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1093 (admitting that while these practices are not "a model for
law enforcement behavior," they are legally-acceptable practices).
32. See id. (holding that the U.S. military is usually prohibited from
participation in domestic law enforcement but may participate in law enforcement
abroad).
33. See Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1093 (stating that the fact that a suspect has been
brought in to the court's jurisdiction by forcible abduction does not impair the
power to try a person).
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expected to feel more confident handing over its nationals to the ICC
than to the United States or the United Kingdom.34
Fourth, and to a lesser degree, this framework should address the
problem of guerilla and rebel groups. There may be circumstances
where such groups illegitimately overthrow democratic
governments.35 In the aftermath of terrorist acts leading up to their
rise to power, it is likely that these rebel groups would not agree to
stand trial for their actions.36 Once again, this situation raises the
question of impunity and reaffirms the validity of ICC jurisdiction as
a well-tailored mechanism by which to condemn unpunished acts of
terrorism.37 This proposition would inevitably entail the involvement
of the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council, and becomes
relevant to my last consideration.38
Fifth, the role of the U.N. Security Council in establishing ICC
jurisdiction is pertinent.39 In some instances, the international
community may call upon the Security Council to decide the fate of
34. See Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. 3, 5 (April 14, 1992) (commenting on the
extreme reluctance of the Libyan government to have their nationals tried in the
United Kingdom).
35. See Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling
against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A19120, para. 1 (1973) [hereinafter UN Resolution
on Colonial Domination] ("The struggle of peoples under colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes for, the implementation of their right of self-
determination and independence is legitimate and in full accordance with the
principles of international law."), available at http://ods-dds-
ny. un. org/doc/RESOLUTION/GENNRO/281/75/IMG/NRO28175.pdf?OpenElemen
t (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
36. See id. at 142 (stating that an attempt to suppress the struggle against alien
domination is against the Charter of the United Nations).
37. See id. at 142 (noting that states should afford rebels fighting against racist
regimes the status of prisoners of war if captured).
38. See id. at 143 (stating that the violation of the legal status of combatants
fighting against colonial powers implicates full responsibility under international
law).
39. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal
Categories of International Law, 12 EURO. J. OF INT'L L. 993, 994 (2001) (noting
that some commentators have defined the terrorist attacks of September 11 th as
crimes against humanity), available at
http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Vol 12/No5/120993.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
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a suspected terrorist.40 In making such a determination amidst a
politically-hostile climate, referring the matter to the ICC could
constitute an effective and expeditious solution.4' In other words, as
a response to those difficult cases, I propose making the decision of
the Security Council one of the bases for establishing jurisdiction
under the ICC.
42
I now venture into the article's main analysis, which sets out to
determine whether acts of international terrorism qualify as crimes
against humanity. In doing so, I shall first review the jurisdiction of
the ICC as it currently stands. Secondly, after briefly reviewing the
concepts of international terrorism and crimes against humanity, I
shall engage in a detailed analysis of this issue under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute.43
I. CURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. THE ROME STATUTE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Following the Rome Conference, those crimes that fall under the
jurisdiction of the ICC have been clearly identified as the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.44 In fact, the negotiations between Member States led to
the integration of Articles 6, 7, and 8 in the Rome Statute: which
include express provisions outlining the aforementioned crimes,
along with details regarding the requisite elements of each crime.
This article concentrates on crimes against humanity and retains the
specific statutory definitions and requirements tailored to this crime.
40. See id. at 995 (commenting that, although the Security Council does not
have an armed force at its disposal, it may authorize the use of force).
41. See id. at 994 (noting that whether the ICC can adjudicate terrorism cases
depends partially on the legal definition of terrorism).
42. See id. at 997 (explaining that the Security Council issued an ambiguous
and contradictory resolution following the September 11 th terrorist attacks).
43. See id. at 994 (commenting that the United Nations may not consider some
acts of terrorism serious enough to try before an international tribunal).
44. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (stating that the jurisdiction of the
ICC is limited to only the most serious crimes).
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Article 7(1) is the essential guideline for identifying ICC jurisdiction
with regard to crimes against humanity and reads as follows:
ARTICLE 7
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
1. For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime against humanity' means any of
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g)Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph
3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.45
Therefore, the standards contained in Article 7(1), along with the
additional elements found in Article 7(2)(3), are applicable to all
crimes against humanity, and consecrate ICC jurisdiction over such
acts. In fact, the Rome Statute is the first multilateral treaty to
address and incorporate the concept of crimes against humanity as a
whole. It is worth noting that, in itself, the Rome Statute does not
45. Id. art.7.
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purport to modify or amend existing principles of international law.46
However, Article 7(2)(a) is noteworthy, and serves as the primary
limitation to this portion of the Rome Statute.
In sum, while maintaining its role as a mechanism complementary
to national jurisdictions, the ICC will investigate and prosecute
crimes that the international community considers the most serious;
48
crimes against humanity are no exception. The ICC will investigate
and prosecute only when national jurisdictions are incapable of
initiating genuine and effective proceedings for a given crime.49
National courts, namely the High Court of Australia, 0 have
affirmed that crimes against humanity should warrant universal
jurisdiction. 51 Other domestic courts have followed suit, emphasizing
46. See id. art. 10 ("Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute.").
47. See id. art 7 (placing limitations on some of the crimes against humanity
listed in the Rome Statute).
48. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ("Affirming that the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.").
49. See Jennifer Llewellyn and Sandra Raponi, The Protection of Human
Rights Through International Criminal Law: A Conversation With Madam Justice
Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 57(1) U.T. FAC. L. REv. 83, 96 (1999)
(emphasizing the importance of an international body like the ICC in
compensating for flawed or corrupt national prosecutions and failure to prosecute
international crimes).
50. See Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, 14 L.R.T.W.C. 89, 109 (1949) (stating that,
when trying war crimes or analogous crimes, the duty of the Court did not only
pertain solely to national justice, but also purported to "giv[e] expression to the
sense of justice to the community of Nations, which sense had been most deeply
shocked by such crimes"); see also Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth of Australia
and Another, (1991) 101 A.L.R. 545, 651 (declaring that crimes against humanity
should fall under universal jurisdiction).
51. See United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(revoking the U.S. certificate of naturalization of a former Nazi concentration
camp guard); Re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(stating that the State of Israel sought and obtained extradition for crimes against
the Jewish people, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that Israel could prosecute
on the basis of the principle of universality). The Court stated that crimes similar
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that the principle of universality supersedes territoriality in
prosecuting such crimes at the national level.5 2 Hence, there is
international consensus for the proposition that any state exercising
control over perpetrators of crimes against humanity can prosecute
them while upholding the moral interests of humanity. 3
Nevertheless, in the spirit of complementarity, a framework like
the Rome Statute remains effective only when national prosecution
is unlikely or devoid of a genuine effort to pursue the matter
seriously.5 4 Whether attributable to impunity vis-di-vis the alleged
criminals or the unwillingness of a state to extradite such individuals,
the lack of a serious prosecution should trigger the jurisdiction of the
ICC.55
B. THE EXCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY
It is interesting to note that, as the Rome Conference unfolded,
several states expressed the wish to include acts of international
to the ones before it warranted prosecution by any state exercising custody over
the perpetrators. Id. It was the opinion of the Court that these offenses attract
universal condemnation. Id.
52. See Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, 811 (1994) ("The only reason Canadian
courts can prosecute individuals such as Imre Finta is because the acts he is alleged
to have committed are viewed as being war crimes or crimes against humanity").
A former captain in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, Imre Finta, was accused of
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Id. Justice Cory, writing for the majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that Canadian courts are bound by the
principle of territoriality. Id. Hence, they can only prosecute offenses committed
on Canadian soil. Id. However, the learned judge added that the principle of
universality constitutes an exception to the principle of territoriality, and set out
several criteria that must be satisfied in order for the jurisdiction of Canadian
courts to be extended. Id.
53. See Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 806 ("Jurisdiction is based upon the accused's attack
upon the international order as a whole and is of common concern to all mankind
as a sort of international public policy").
54. See id. at 807 (holding that the ability to try non-national criminals in
Canada for crimes committed abroad is carefully-circumscribed and quite limited).
55. See id. at 813 (noting that there is no current definition for the mental
element of crimes against humanity).
1022 [19:1009
RETHINKING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC
terrorism under ICC jurisdiction. 6 Algeria, Armenia, Congo, India,
Israel, Kyrgyz Republic, Libya, Macedonia, Russia, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, and Turkey all voiced the opinion that the treaty should
address such crimes. 57 Most important to the ideas presented in this
article is the fact that four states, namely Algeria, India, Sri Lanka,
and Turkey, supported the argument that international terrorism
should fall within ICC jurisdiction under the heading of crimes
against humanity. 8 This position approximates the central approach
of this article, which is two-fold in character: on one hand, studying
and analyzing the legal concepts of international terrorism and
crimes against humanity and, on the other hand, gravitating towards
a point of convergence or intersection between both crimes on the
theory that combating terrorism has become a priority for the
international community.
At the time of the Rome Conference, the proposal to include
international terrorism under ICC jurisdiction as a crime against
humanity met with emphatic disapproval. Fears that the
politicization of the ICC could result from this proposal were
influential: jurisdiction over international terrorism was never
explicitly granted to the ICC. The American delegation firmly
opposed the inclusion of terrorism in the treaty, and remained a
persistent objector.5 9
56. See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 227
(Oxford University Press 2001) (noting that Algeria thought that international
terrorism was a threat against the foundation of a state).
57. See id. (commenting that the non-inclusion of terrorism as a crime against
humanity was one reason that Syria and Turkey abstained from voting to adopt the
Rome Statute).
58. Cassese, supra note 39, at 994.
59. See id. (pointing out that the American delegation rejected the proposal that
terrorism be included in the Rome Statute). The American delegates provided four
grounds to justify their decision to reject the proposed inclusion of terrorism:
(i) the offence was not well defined; (ii) in their view the inclusion of this
crime would politicize the Court; (iii) some acts of terrorism were not
sufficiently serious to warrant prosecution by an international tribunal; (iv)
generally speaking, prosecution and punishment by national courts were
considered more efficient than by international tribunals.
Id.; see also UN Resolution on Colonial Domination, supra note 35, at 142 ("The
struggles of peoples under colonial and alien domination and racist regimes for the
implementation of their right of self-determination and independence is legitimate
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Many of the states that endorsed the inclusion of terrorism within
the scope of the ICC are, in fact, plagued with constant, if not daily,
acts of terrorism. 60 However, the position taken by the recalcitrant
states is not wholly incongruent with jurisprudence dealing with
terrorism.6" In fact, in a 1984 decision, the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia took the same line as the majority of states at
the Rome Conference, rejecting the idea of universal jurisdiction
over terrorism. 62 The court focused the judgement around the
premise that international consensus on the definition of international
terrorism as a crime under customary law was lacking.63 Other
and in full accordance with the principles of international law."). See generally
Michael D. Mysak, Judging the Giant: An Examination ofAmerican Opposition to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 63 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV.
275 (2001) (commenting on the broader issues of the United States' opposition to
the Rome Statute).
. 60. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 227 (pointing out that "[aiccording
to Algeria, international terrorism is a threat against the foundation of a State and a
denial of democratic values. For Israel, there needs to be a correct balance between
recognizing terrorism as an international crime and focusing on the most practical
and effective means of cooperation in bringing international terrorists to justice...
The eventual non-inclusion of this crime within the ICC's jurisdiction compelled
Sri Lanka and Turkey to abstain from voting to adopt the Rome Statute."). On the
same topic, see P. Kirsch, Terrorisme, crimes contre l'humanit et Cour Pnale
Internationale (2001) Coalition pour la Cour P6nale Internationale, available at
http://www.iccnow.org/francais/opinion/articles/kirsch.pdf (last visited on May 12,
2004), at 2.
61. See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 2 (detailing those reasons given by states to
justify excluding terrorism from the ICC's jurisdiction).
62. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (upholding the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Survivors and representatives of people murdered in an attack on a bus in Israel
brought this case against the Libyan Arab Republic. Id. at 775.
63. Id. at 795.
I turn next to consider whether terrorism is itself a law of nations violation.
While this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorist attacks, that sentiment
is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the world are so divisively split on the
legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of
harmony or consensus. Unlike the issue of individual responsibility, which
much of the world has never even reached, terrorism has evoked strident
reactions and sparked strong alliances among numerous states. Given this
division, I do not believe that under current law terrorist attacks amount to
law of nations violations.
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common law and civil law jurisdictions have reached similar
conclusions.64
C. POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A.
CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
With all due deference, this author hereby submits that the status
of international criminal law has evolved, and now adopts a more
modern approach, blending the traditional elements of the crime
against humanity with the reality of a post-September 11 th world.65
Consequently, it is my opinion that ICC member states must give
careful consideration to the issue of terrorism in order to achieve
significant corresponding changes in the area of international
criminal law. For instance, former ICTY Judge Antonio Cassese is
adamant that the events of September 11th should necessarily
influence the international community to revisit the Rome Statute
with regard to crimes against humanity.66 I fully endorse this view,
64. See Salvatore Zappal, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from
Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cmy
de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 595, 607-11 (2001) (discussing the Ghaddafi
case, which raised the issue whether terrorism constituted an international crime).
In this case, decided on March 13, 2001, the French Court of Cassation confronted
a serious case of terrorism involving Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi, in which
it had to determine whether terrorism constituted an international crime warranting
the Court to deny protective immunity to heads of state. Id. The Court ended up
quashing the proceedings against the leader, holding that terrorism did not equate
to an international crime. Id.
65. See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529,
554 (proclaiming that international ,law is anything but static and that,
consequently, courts must recognize its ability to evolve).
It is certain that international law does change. I would use of international
law the words which Galileo used of the earth: 'But it does move.'
International law does change: and the courts have applied the changes
without the aid of any act of Parliament. Thus, when the rules of international
law were changed (by the force of public opinion) so as to condemn the
slaver, the English courts were justified in applying the modem rules of
international law.
Id.
66. See Cassese, supra note 39, at 993-95 (commenting on the effects of the
terrorist attacks of September 11 th).
The terrorist attack of 11 September has had atrocious effects not only at the
human, psychological and political level. It is also having shattering
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and so join many public figures , many of whom occupy the legal
profession.67
The idea of including terrorism under the jurisdiction of an
international criminal court is not a novel concept. In fact, it
emanates from ideas over half a century old, some of which have
their origin in the vestiges of the First World War. Following that
conflict, the League of Nations, on November 16, 1937, adopted the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in order
to counteract terrorist activity that had taken place after the war.68
The treaty provided for the creation of an international criminal
court. The Convention never entered into force, and the court was
never implemented.69
consequences for international law. It is subverting some important legal
categories, thereby imposing the need to rethink them, on the one hand, and to
lay emphasis on general principles, on the other ... that atrocious action
exhibits all the hallmarks of crimes against humanity: the magnitude and
extreme gravity of the attack as well as the fact that it has targeted civilians, is
an affront to all humanity, and part of a widespread or systematic practice.
Id.
67. See UN News Centre, Terror Attacks on US Were Crimes Against
Humanity, UN Rights Official Says (Sept. 25, 200 1)(noting that the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has also adopted this view
that the terrorist attacks against the United States were "crimes against humanity"),
at http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID= 1613&Cr=terror&Crl
=attack (last visited Mar. 22, 2004). Distinguished international lawyers have also
expressed this position. See Cassese, supra note 39, at n.7 (specifically naming
Alain Pellet and British lawyer Geoffrey Robertson as lawyers who have written
on the subject); see also Geoffrey Robertson, American Could Settle This Score
Without Spilling the Blood Across Afghanistan, THE TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 18,
2001 (declaring that the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th, 2001 should be
declared a "crime against humanity").
68. See United Nations Assoc. of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Fight
Against Terrorism: Terrorism and Human Rights (noting that the first attempt to
deal with terrorism was the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism), at http://www.una-uk.org/terrorism/terrorismhr.html (last visited Apr.
30, 2004).
69. See Commission on Human Rights, Specific Human Rights Issues: New
Priorities, In Particular Terrorism, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/WP.1 (Aug. 8, 2003)
(pointing out that the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
never got off the ground), available at
www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/BDA86CA424D4E9E 1 C 1256D830028
E78B/$File/G0315792.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
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In 1994, the International Law Commission ("ILC") contemplated
a similar initiative in its project concerning the Statute of the
International Criminal Court.7" The notion of international
jurisdiction over terrorism would emerge once again in 1998, in the
preliminary dialogue to the Rome Conference. 1 In addition to a list
of major crimes eventually incorporated into the Rome Statute as
"most serious crimes of international concern, 7 2 the ILC suggested
including crimes under ICC jurisdiction, such as terrorism and drug
trafficking.73 However, the ensuing negotiations produced an overall
sentiment that the Rome Statute should limit jurisdiction to serious
crimes already enumerated.74 Some authors still defend the inclusion
of terrorism under ICC jurisdiction, and their argument is growing
stronger, particularly as global consensus denouncing the acts of
September 1 1th and seeking to prevent the recurrence of such a
tragedy has grown.75
70. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
sixth session, at 70, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), (1994) (listing genocide,
aggression, and crimes against humanity as crimes to which the Court's
jurisdiction extends).
71. See International Criminal Court, Historical Background (noting that the
Rome Statute of 1998 established the International Criminal Court, whose purpose
was to make sure the gravest international crimes would not go unpunished), at
www.icc-cpi.int/php/show.php?id =history (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
72. Rome Statute supra note 1, art. I (introducing the purpose of the
International Criminal Court).
73. But see id., art. 5 (failing to include the crimes of terrorism and drug
trafficking in the Statute's final version).
74. See id., art. 5-8 (enumerating and describing the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression).
75. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 60, at 1 (highlighting that Kirsch, the author
and the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, felt that the events of September 11 th revealed international mechanisms'
inability to adequately deal with acts of terrorism). Kirsch also adds that, although
international terrorism does not fall under ICC jurisdiction, it could qualify as a
crime against humanity, and thus be subject to international punishment,
notwithstanding applicable domestic or national sanctions. Id.; see also
International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers, Question 11 (noting that
this section does not refute the possibility that international terrorism could fall
under the heading of crimes against humanity), at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/php/show/php!id=faq (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
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Similarly, during the eighth session of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court ("PCICC"), Turkey
submitted a document in which it asserted that acts of terrorism
constituted some of the most significant threats to peace. 6 Moreover,
it opined that the global community should not have to wait the
prescribed time period7 7 to amend the Rome Statute and to recognize
terrorism as a particularly repugnant infraction. 78 Turkey suggested a
pragmatic approach to tackling the issue of terrorism and to
broadening the jurisdiction of the court 7 9 arguing that law must
adapt to reality and underlining two possible avenues by which to
enact effective and proactive changes that would place terrorism in a
specific category of crimes. Corresponding amendments could be
initiated either through the vehicle of the PCICC or via an
international conference."0 In its view, Turkey's objective was to
create a category8 ' of crimes separate from those already explicitly
enumerated in the Rome Statute.
Could the International Criminal Court deal with terrorist acts within its
existing jurisdiction? The International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction
over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The ICC may be able
to prosecute terrorist acts when they amount to these crimes. All countries
have a duty to take all necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist
acts and bring alleged terrorists to justice.
Id.
76. See Comments by Turkey with regard to the terrorist crimes,
PCNICC/2001/DP. I of 2 October 2001 [hereinafter Comments by Turkey] (listing
terrorism as a significant threat to peace).
77. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, Article 121(1) (noting that only state
parties can propose amendments to the Rome Statute after the expiry of seven
years from the Statute's entry into force).
78. See Comments by Turkey, supra note 76 (describing further Turkey's
suggestions and comments regarding Article 121(1) and the prescribed waiting
period for the amendment of the Rome Statute).
79. See id. (illustrating Turkey's personal take on the issues of terrorism vis-A-
vis jurisdiction).
80. See id. (attempting to take a realistic and practical approach to amending
the Rome Statute).
81. See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 5 (explaining that many war crimes described
in the Rome Statute could also amount to acts of terrorism when they are part of an
intentional attack aiming to instigate terror, thereby constituting an affront to
fundamental principles of international law). Kirsch provides the following
examples within the Rome Statute: Articles 8(2)(a)(i), (iii), (iv), 8(2)(b)(i), (ii), (v),(xiii), 8(2)(c)(i), (ii), (iii), 8(2)(e)(i), (ii), (xii). Id.
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I commend this Turkish initiative. However, I respectfully
advance a divergent strategy vis-d-vis the inclusion of terrorism
within ICC jurisdiction. The contemplated solution would be
deployed through the policies and interpretation of the soon-to-be
fully-operational ICC, relying on well-established legal guidelines
delineated by other major international tribunals such as the ICTY
and ICTR. I submit, on the contrary, that many acts of international
terrorism already qualify as crimes against humanity, as they fulfill
the requisite elements established under the Rome Statute. In other
words, the text of the Rome Statute should stand as it is presently
formulated, for it allows the international community to include
crimes of terrorism under Article 7. Furthermore, I recommend that
the international community should include crimes of terrorism
under Article 7, bearing in mind the fundamental underpinnings of
the ICC: deterrence, punishment of international crimes, and justice
for victims.82
As I have previously outlined, many leading international jurists
support this conclusion and, in my opinion, rightly so.83
Nevertheless, it is useful to conduct a serious analysis to determine
whether acts of international terrorism could converge so as to fall
under the heading of "crimes against humanity." Firstly, I will
briefly review the concept of international terrorism. Secondly, I will
examine the concept of crimes against humanity, predominantly by
surveying the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR.
82. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (laying out the purpose of the ICC).
83. See generally Coleen Enache-Brown and Ari Fried, Universal Crime,
Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation ofAut Dedere Aut Judicare in International
Law, 43 MCGILL L. J. 613, 624 (1998) (asserting that the definition of "universal
crimes" should be expanded in light of new offenses, such as hijacking); see also
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 785, 788, 815 (noting that since World War II, universal jurisdiction has
expanded and now covers terrorist activities). Some scholars also suggest that the
concept of universality serves as an effective vehicle by which to promote
international condemnation of terrorist acts. Id.; see, e.g., Rudiger Wolfram, The
Decentralized Prosecution of International Offenses Through National Courts, in
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 235 (Yoram Dinstein and Mala
Tabory, eds., Kluwer Law International 1996) (suggesting that universal
jurisdiction protects the interests of all people).
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II. RETHINKING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT: RECOGNIZING TERRORISM AS A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY
A. DEFINING TERRORISM
Many new buzzwords emanate from September 11 th. Whether
states were referred to as "evildoers" or described as part of "the axis
of evil," it was clear that a new vocabulary emerged from the rubble
and debris.8 4 Most importantly, a new international priority was
proclaimed: combating international terrorism. 5 However, it seems
that the most important buzzword in this global campaign,
"terrorism," is still poorly-defined among the international
community. 6 States have yet to agree upon a universal definition for
terrorism. 7 One of the obvious obstacles to reaching an agreement
on the definition of terrorism derives simply from the fear of
politicization.8 This lack of consensus can be substantiated by
reviewing the United Nations' historical treatment of terrorism.89 I
84. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address at the United
States Capital, Washington D.C. (Jan. 29. 2002) (introducing both of these terms
into the American vocabulary when referencing proponents of terrorism and anti-
American sentiment), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 l.html (last visited
3/23/2004).
85. See id. (referencing Bush's first enumerated goal in which he states, "My
hope is that all nations will heed my call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who
threaten their countries and my own.")
86. See Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism U.N. Doc. A/58/116 (2003) (noting that, as of
December 2003, there were twenty-one global or regional agreements relating to
international terrorism).
87. See A.C. AREND & R.J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 141 (Routledge 1993) (commenting
that while there are multiple definitions for the term "terrorism," there are some
common elements to each varying definition).
88. See Aaron Noteboom, Terrorism: I Know it When I See It, 91 OR. L. REV.
553, 565 (stating that different countries have varying purposes for subscribing to
different definitions that cater to their own interests).
89. See Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or
Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of
the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie
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do not purport to engage in an extensive review of the history of
efforts to define the crime of terrorism.9" However, it is useful to
briefly highlight some of the more recent efforts and some of the
milestones along the road to a definition.9'
in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to
Sacrifce Human Lives, Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical
Changes, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 27th Sess., U.N. G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII)
(1972) (highlighting the international community's reaction to the assassination of
Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics and the creation of a U.N. Committee
on Terrorism).
90. See Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or
Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of
the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie
in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to
Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical
Changes, G.A. Res.40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/61 (1985)
(providing a brief history of the treatment of terrorism by the United Nations).
91. For a detailed history of General Assembly Resolutions on the topic of
terrorism preceding and following the 1985 landmark document, see Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives
or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of
those forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration,
Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives,
Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 3034,
U.N.GAOR., 27th Sess., (1972); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and
Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 31/102, U.N.GAOR, 31st Sess.,
(1976); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes
Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the
Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie in
Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to
Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical
Changes, G.A. Res. 32/147, U.N.GAOR, 32d Sess. (1977); Measures to Prevent
International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or
Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those
forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration,
Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives,
Including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 34/145,
U.N.GAOR, 34th Sess. (1979); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and
Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an
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Following the.Cold War, the United Nations was undeterred in its
efforts to combat (and define) terrorism. In fact, in General
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 36/106, U.N.GAOR, 36th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/109 (1981); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or-Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and
Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 38/130, U.N.GAOR, 38th Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/RES/38/130 (1983); Inadmissibility of the Policy of State Terrorism
and Any Actions by States Aimed at Undermining the Sociopolitical System in
other Sovereign States, G.A. Res. 39/159, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/159 (1984); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which
Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and
Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 42/159, U.N.GAOR, 42d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/42/159 (1987); Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which
Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental
Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of those forms of Terrorism and
Acts of Violence which lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and
which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including their Own, in an
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res.' 44/29, U.N.GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/29 (1989); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 46/51, GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N..Doc. A/RES/46/51 (1991); Human Rights
and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 48/122, GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/122
(1993); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, GAOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/49/60 (1994); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A.
Res., 49/185, GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/185 (1994); Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 50/53, GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc
A/RES/50/53 (1995) [hereinafter Resolution 53]; Human Rights and Terrorism,
G.A. Res. 50/186, GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/186 (1995); Measures
to Eliminate International Terrorism, GAOR, 51st Sess., G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996); Human Rights and Terrorism, GAOR, 52d Sess.,
G.A. Res. 52/133, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/133 (1998); Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, GAOR, 52d Sess., G.A. Res. 52/165, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/165 (1998); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
53/108, GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doe. A/RES/53/108 (1999); International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109,
GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000); Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, G.A.Res. 54/110, GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
AJRES/54/110 (2000); Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/164, GAOR,
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/164 (2000); Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 55/158, GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/158
(2001); Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks in the United States of America, G.A.
Res. 56/1, GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (2001) [hereinafter Res. on
Condemnation of Attacks in USA].
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Assembly Resolution 53 on "Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism," adopted on December 11, 1995, the United Nations
integrated a substantial portion of a definition that was submitted in a
1993 study:
criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them. 92
Although seemingly extensive, the above definition did not
withstand international scrutiny or achieve acceptance. 93
The main obstacle to a universally-accepted definition of terrorism
is easy to identify: states disagree on what constitutes terrorism. 94
The United Nations has been particularly evasive on the subject of
defining terrorism. A salient example lies in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 on international cooperation to combat threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, a recent
92. Resolution 53, supra note 91, para.2; see also AREND, supra note 87, at 141
(identifying three essential elements to the definition of terrorism: "violence,
actual or threatened, a political objective, however conceived, and an intended
audience, typically though not exclusively a wide one").
93. See, e.g., Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (exemplifying the difficulty
that national jurisdictions have faced in applying a universal definition for
terrorism), http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol 1/html/2002
scri_0003.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2004). In Suresh, the Supreme Court of
Canada was faced with a difficult task: balancing Canada's interest in combating
terrorism against a refugee's interest in not being deported to a country where he
would likely be subject to torture. Id. Of particular importance to the current
discussion is the Court's finding that there is no universally-accepted definition of
terrorism, but that the crime is sufficiently settled in law to guide a judgment on
the matter. Id. Ultimately, the Court opted for a definition found in a multilateral
treaty, under the aegis of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. Id. This example tends to demonstrate that national courts
are making progress in this field, and perhaps leading the way in clarifying the
concept of terrorism. Id. Similarly, the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act now provides
a definition of terrorism, and includes reference to several multilateral treaties on
terrorism. Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41.
94. See Noteboom, supra note 88 at 563-65 (outlining the international debate
regarding the definition of terrorism).
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landmark in the fight against terrorism.95 The document clearly
deplores acts of international terrorism and specifies that any act of
terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security, but
fails to provide a definition of terrorism.96
It is fair to say that most states have a common vision of what
elements should be present. 7 Based on most national definitions of
terrorism, or on the understanding most states have of the concept, I
submit that two elements are essential: the targeting of civilians and
the existence of an ideological or political purpose.98 The former
entails a serious debate on the distinction between combatants and
non-combatants; as well as a series of considerations relevant to the
Geneva Convention. The second element ties into the motivations
behind terrorism, and moves toward a standard that defies the "usual
criminal behavior" model and looks to deeply-rooted or inherent
95. See U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 438th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1373 (2001)
(discussing states' obligations to combat terrorism while never effectively
determining a set definition for the term).
96. See id. ("Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts...").
97. See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On
Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (discussing the
safety of aviation); see also Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (commenting on
aircraft hijackings); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Jan. 26, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565 T.I.A.S. No. 7570
(addressing acts of aviation sabotage, such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (outlawing attacks on senior
government officials and diplomats); International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages Dec. 18, 1979 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (decrying the taking of hostages);
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Mar. 3, 1980
(combating unlawful taking and use of nuclear material).
98. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(l)-(d)(2) (2000) (indicating
that,"international terrorism" is generally understood as "terrorism involving
citizens or the territory of more than 1 country" and defining the term "as
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents").
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dimensions of the terrorists' belief system, religious motivations, or
political agenda.99
Endeavoring to define the term "terrorism" would clearly extend
beyond the scope of this project. Moreover, unlike buzzwords that
may be coined almost instantaneously, a universal definition of
terrorism might send the international community back to the
drawing board for some time. However, most states have delineated
the term so as to include the two aforementioned elements. 00 Of
particular importance to my discussion is the first element, namely
the targeting of civilians, as it is mirrored in the Rome Statute.' 0' In
fact, its language is evocative of a sine qua non of crimes against
humanity: that an attack be directed against a civilian population.
10 2
At the outset, one can immediately appreciate the degree of
proximity and compatibility between notions of terrorism and crimes
against humanity. 103 The legal status of the acts perpetrated on
September 1 1th remains undisputed: such crimes undoubtedly
amount to international terrorism.'0 4 I now refer to these events in
order to analyze whether terrorist acts qualify as crimes against
humanity. In my view, the current definition of terrorism does not, in
any way, preclude the ICC from adjudicating acts of terrorism under
the heading of crimes against humanity. On the contrary, the
definition of terrorism as understood by a majority of states fits
neatly under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 05 Consequently, I
99. See Noteboom, supra note 88, at 565 (noting that countries often struggle
with the distinction between terrorism and the "legitimate struggle of an occupied
people for liberation").
100. See id. (providing an overview of multiple definitions of terrorism).
101. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity to
mean systematic attacks against a civilian population).
102. Id.
103. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f)(d) (defining terrorism as politically-
motivated violence against civilians) with Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7
(describing crimes against humanity as attacks against civilians).
104. See U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001)
(stating that the international community recognized that the acts perpetrated by
members of Al Qaeda amount to terrorism, and recognizing the right of the United
States and its allies to use force in self-defense vis-A-vis the attacks).
105. See supra note 103 (comparing the text of the United States Code with the
Rome Statute and finding that the two are compatible).
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contend that it is unnecessary to amend the Statute to encompass acts
of terrorism.
B. SPECIFIC ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
1. Al Qaeda Network and September 11, 2001
Ample reference has been made in legal scholarship to the events
surrounding September 1 lth, 2001. It has now become universal
knowledge that four distinct attacks were perpetrated against citizens
of the United States on that date: two of which consisted of hijacking
two planes full of civilians and crashing them into the Twin Towers
of the World Trade Center ("WTC") in New York City; one of
which consisted of hijacking a plane full of civilians and crashing it
into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and one of which consisted
of hijacking a plane full of civilians, presumably to strike another
landmark in Washington, D.C..1°6 The final attack was apparently
aborted; the plane plummeted to the ground, never reaching its
destination.107 The results were devastating: over 3,000 confirmed
deaths associated with the WTC explosions, confirmed deaths of all
crew and passengers onboard the four hijacked planes, missing
persons, several wounded by the explosions, mass destruction to
property, including the collapse of both WTC towers, the
implementation of parallel crisis management initiatives leading to
more deaths of involved on field personnel, etc. These facts have
been reiterated endlessly by media organizations across the globe
and virtually no controversy exists on the factual background of
these events or on their immediate aftermath, except for some
adjustment of the final death toll.
Nor is there any disagreement as to the identity of the terrorists
responsible for perpetrating the aforementioned crimes.108 Al Qaeda,
106. See, e.g., David Von Drehle, World War, Cold War Won, Now the Gray
War, WASH. POST, Sept. 12. 2001, at A09 (detailing the September 11 th attacks).
107. See, e.g., September 11: Chronology of Fear (noting the crash of flight 93
in Pennsylvania at 10:10 A.M), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack (last visited Apr. 30,
2004).
108. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People (Sept. 20, 2001) (noting the role of Al Qaeda in the
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an Afghanistan-based network with terrorist cells across the globe,
claimed responsibility for the attacks of September 1 lth. 1°9 With the
support of the local Taliban government, Al Qaeda's leader, wanted
terrorist Osama bin Laden, orchestrated these attacks, 10 and also
claimed responsibility for other terrorist activities.III
The response has been a strong consensus among the international
community, led by the United States, on the primacy of policies
directed at combating and suppressing international terrorism."1 2 In
September 11th attacks),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004).
109. See id. (declaring that "Americans have many questions tonight. Americans
are asking: Who attacked my country? The evidence we have gathered all points to
a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.").
110. See id. (identifying Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda and noting
his links to many other terrorist organizations in over sixty countries).
111. See, e.g., Embassy Bombers Sentenced to Life without Parole, PBS News
(outlining the sentences four Al-Qaeda terrorists, all associates of bin Laden,
received for the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998),.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/octoberO1/embassy-10-1 8.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004).
112. See News and Notes-Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon - Balancing the Interests, HUM. RTS. & U.K. PRACTICE 2.5(2), (Dec. 3,
2001) (commenting on the international effects of September 11 th, and how many
countries reviewed their legislation in order to provide greater security to their
citizens), LEXIS, Legal (excluding U.S.), United Kingdom, Journals. Reference is
made to such changes in the United Kingdom as well as to obligations under the
European Court of Human Rights. Id.
One of the results of the horrendous events on 11 September 2001 in the USA
is that all countries are taking a long and hard look at what legislative steps
might be taken, in addition to the other practical measures, to protect their
respective citizens. In the United Kingdom there is talk of identity cards,
changing the rules on extradition, and seeking derogation from Article 5 of
the ECHR to allow the detention of suspected terrorists. There has not been
the usual storm of protests about identity cards and, as one who probably has
an original end-of-war identity card lurking somewhere in the house, I have
never understood what all the fuss is about. There have been derogations
before for dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland, and what critics seem to
be stressing is that any powers should be temporary and clearly for
emergency use. In addition to the ECHR we also have responsibilities under
the European Convention on Terrorism, and on extradition there are always
sensitive issues to be considered. The scales have to be evenly balanced
between preserving the interests of suspects and protecting the public, and in
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fact, the U.N. General Assembly, on September 18, 2001, set the
tone for what was to translate into a priority on the international
agenda: namely, eliminating terrorist threats." 3 As early as a week
after the attacks, one could clearly detect a common wish to forestall
terrorism and bring these types of actors to justice. 1 4
I firmly believe that such acts could be prosecuted effectively in
international fora such as the ICC, while striking a balance between
two fundamental objectives: on one hand, reflecting the ideals of the
Charter of the United Nations and commonly-accepted principles of
international law while, on the other hand, achieving justice against
the perpetrators on behalf of the victims and those who mourn
them.l"5
The legal status of the acts surrounding September 1 1th is
uncontested; the international community did not hesitate to
characterize the actions of Al Qaeda as terrorism.' 16 However, from a
strictly legal perspective, these acts also meet the generally-accepted
legal requirements for the definition(s) of terrorism.1 7 Firstly, these
the present climate of opinion it is unlikely that there will be too many
challenges to the government's proposals. Nevertheless, important issues are
being raised, and one of my regular contributors, Dr Brown, will consider
these options in the next issue.
Id.
113. See Res. on Condemnation of Attacks in USA, supra note 91 (condemning
the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on September 11 th).
114. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001), supra note 104 (stating the
international community's outrage at the September 1 Ith attacks and extending
condolences).
115. Cassese, supra note 39, at 1001.
The response to the appalling tragedy of 11 September may lead to acceptable
legal change in the international community only if reasonable measures are
taken, as much as possible on a collective basis, which do not collide with the
generally accepted principles of this community. Otherwise, the road would
be open to the setting in of that anarchy in the international community so
eagerly pursued by terrorists.
Id. (emphasis in original).
116. See, e.g., Res. on Condemnation of Attacks in USA, supra note 91
(condemning the September 11 th attacks as unabashed acts of terrorism); see also
Kirsch, supra note 60 (agreeing that the September 11 th attacks were unlawful acts
of terrorism); Cassese, supra note 39 (concurring with this legal characterization).
117. See supra Part II.A (laying out the generally-accepted elements of the
definition of the word "terrorism").
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acts were intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons."18 It is
also widely known that, following the Persian Gulf Conflict, Al
Qaeda waged war, or jihad, against the Western World, especially
against Americans, commonly labeled "infidels" by Muslim
fundamentalist terrorist groups. The admitted goal of the September
1 th attacks was to terrorize the American population, particularly
the citizens of New York City and Washington, D.C. In doing so, it
catapulted Americans into a state of chaos and panic that was
eventually replaced by sorrow and grief." 19 A deep collective feeling
of paranoia and anxiety marked the months following the attacks, all
attributable to the terror instigated by members of Al Qaeda.
Secondly, there is no debate on the criminal nature of the perpetrated
offenses; the direct consequences of hijacking four planes were the
deaths of thousands of innocent citizens. 20 Finally, the bases upon
which Al Qaeda carried out these acts of terrorism arguably
correspond: there was obviously a strong religious element to these
actions, but also a political dimension with regard, amongst other
things, to the United States' policy of support for Israel. One could
also argue that there are other deeply-rooted ideological and
philosophical motives that drove Al Qaeda to orchestrate the
attacks. 121
118. See generally Noteboom, supra note 88, at 569 (commenting on the
political aspirations of terrorists and terrorist acts).
119. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People, supra note 108 (commenting on the sorrows and strength of
the United States following the September 11 th attacks).
120. See id. (noting the deaths of not only Americans but also Pakistani, Indian,
Israeli, El Salvadorian, Iranian, Mexican, Japanese, and British citizens).
121. See William Carley & Timothy O'Brien, 'New Kind of Terrorist, Amateur
and Ad Hoc, Worries Authorities', 3(3) FORENSICS, POLICING AND THE LAW,
paras. 4, 5, 10, 13, 14 (1995) (exploring the context of Muslim extremism and its
motives for making Westerners the target of terrorist acts). The article was
prompted by a previous terrorist bombing on the WTC in 1995, which left six
people dead and approximately a thousand people injured. Id. In addition, the
authors explored further reasons behind terrorist actions and, in the following
excerpt, eerily foreshadowed the events that would transpire over the six years that
followed the publication of their article:
[tierrorist attacks around the world by Muslim extremists may grow for
several reasons, analysts say. Mr. AbuKhalil cites widespread poverty, as
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It is apparent that there is a logistical difficulty in prosecuting the
culprits behind the September l1th attacks. 2  Although the
responsibility of Al Qaeda's superiors, such as Osama bin Laden,
may be established, all those terrorists on board the four planes (and
thus all those directly responsible) perished in the explosions.
Therefore, it is impossible to prosecute these criminals in
international or national fora. 123 However, as I have mentioned
previously, the acts of September 11th are invoked here as an
example-a standard against which to measure subsequent acts of
terrorism. I merely suggest the usefulness of analyzing how the
specific facts surrounding those events fit into existing legal
guidelines associated with crimes against humanity.
2. Application to Other Recent Acts of International Terrorism
In addition, I submit that this application of international criminal
law to facts should be transposed to other acts of terrorism where
applicable, pursuant to the premise that the acts surrounding
well as fundamentalists' frustration because, in many nations, they can't
change things by legitimate means. The fundamentalist electoral victory
last year in Algeria, he notes, has been thwarted by a brutal crackdown by
the secular government in power. Robert Hunter, former directory of
Middle Eastern affairs for the National Security Council, says the
fundamentalist extremists also may gain adherents partly because of the
fading appeal of the older terrorist groups, which failed to win major
political and economic payoffs for the masses of people. He adds that a
new cycle of violence may be spurred by recent events, such as Israel's
move to expel 400 Palestinians and the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. "I
think we'll see more terrorism coming out of radical Islam," Mr. Hunter
concludes... Whether that means more terrorism in the U.S. - in the
manner of the World Trade Center attack - is another question. Mr.
Whipple predicts that there will be more attempts, but that most of them
will be thwarted by U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.
"These plots will be nipped in the bud, and we won't even hear of most of
them," he says. But because these new extremist groups are so hard to
keep track of, Mr. Whipple adds, "a few may slip through."
Id. paras. 27-29 & 31-32.
122. Rowan Scarborough, U.S. Search for bin Laden intensifies, THE WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004 (evidencing the difficulty the U.S. has had in capturing,
much less prosecuting, the mastermind behind the attacks of September 11 th),
http://washingtontimes.com/national/20040223-012312-3087r.htm (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004).
123. Cf Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 11(1) ("The Court has jurisdiction only
with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute.").
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September 11 th qualify as crimes against humanity. In fact, several
acts of international terrorism would, prima facie, seem to amount to
crimes against humanity, based on the considerations I have outlined
above. 24 In any event, it is useful to analyze thoroughly how the acts
of September 11th meet the legal requirements contained in the
Rome Statute. Once it is universally recognized that these events are
crimes against humanity, and correspondingly, that they fall under
ICC jurisdiction, they will translate into a groundbreaking precedent
for the international legal treatment of terrorism.
C. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: GENERAL OVERVIEW
Of importance to ICC jurisdiction is the universal condemnation
of crimes against humanity. Deplored as "inhumane" in character,
these acts violate the very core elements of human decency.'25
Although this section does not purport to deliver an exhaustive
historical and legal background on the concept of crimes against
humanity, it is useful to canvass some of the leading cases and
documents on the matter, in order to give the reader a grasp on the
proximity between such crimes and international terrorism.
The notion and legal application of crimes against humanity
emerged following World War II in the context of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials.'26 The Nuremberg Charter provided an enumeration
124. See infra Part II.F.4. (addressing the concept that alleged terrorists would
have to be linked to other incidents targeting civilians in order to be accountable
for crimes against humanity). One could invoke the recent terrorist bombing in
Bali, Indonesia, where over 180 people, including tourists, perished. Other recent
attacks include the incidents in Kuwait, Yemen, and the hostage-taking by
Chechen rebels in Moscow, Russia. Id.
125. See KJTTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 85, citing Egon Schwelb, Crimes
Against Humanity 23 BYBIL 178, 195-7 (1946) ("A crime against humanity is a
crime against 'humaneness' that offends certain general principles of law and
which becomes the concern of the international community. It has repercussions
beyond international frontiers or exceeds in magnitude or savagery any limits
tolerated by modem civilization.").
126. Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg and Tokyo in Contemporary Perspective, in
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 171,
176-77 (Timothy H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds.) (stating that crimes
against humanity had occurred before the war, but that the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals tried to respect questions of jurisdiction and what had been previously
considered offenses against humanity and aggressive war).
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of crimes against humanity. 27 Although the Nuremberg Charter
incorporated a technical use of the term "crimes against
humanity,"'' 2  and although these crimes were grouped under a
separate category than war crimes,' 29 the Nuremberg Tribunal did not
seem to acknowledge the novelty of their character. Hence, in that
context, the frontier between war crimes and crimes against
humanity was, for all purposes, blurred. 30 In addition, under the
Nuremberg Charter, it was imperative that a crime against humanity
be committed in connection with a crime against peace or a war
crime.13 Although the definition contained in the Nuremberg Charter
applied directly to crimes committed during World War II, it is
127. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] (defining "crimes against
humanity" as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated [emphasis added]").
128. See Schwelb, supra note 125, at 183-84 (expressing that the term "crimes
against humanity" was included with the specific objective of comprehensively
covering those crimes that narrower interpretations of traditionally-used phrases
would not have covered).
129. See id. at 186-87 (highlighting the perception that there were different
categories of crimes: the crime of a German Nazi murdering a German, a Nazi
murdering a Jew, carrying out Nazi enterprise "resulting in atrocities or war
crimes;" and Nazi enterprises involving atrocities as distinguished from war
crimes).
130. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 87 (outlining how the Nuremberg
Tribunal treated crimes against humanity and war crimes as overlapping and
interchangeable, the only major discernible difference being that crimes against
humanity were those committed in Germany or in Austria and Czechoslovakia
annexed as part of Germany, whereas war crimes were committed in territories
occupied by Germany).
131. See id. ("[C]rimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter aimed to
ensure that inhumane acts in violation of general principles of the laws of all
civilized nations committed in connection with war should be punished; therefore,
a crime against humanity was treated as an 'accompanying' or 'accessory' crime to
either crimes against peace of war crimes."); see also Schwelb, supra note 125, at
206 (explaining that the term was to encompass cases not covered by norms
traditionally covering "laws and customs of war").
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interesting to note that the Nuremberg Tribunal considered its
Charter to be "a reflection of current international law.' ' 32
Control Council Law No. 10, at Article II, dated 20 December
1945, also contained an enumeration of crimes against humanity. 133
This law effectively implemented the concept of crimes against
humanity. Its practical ramifications were two-fold: on one hand, it
expanded the list of specific crimes embodied under the Nuremberg
Charter,'34 while, on the other hand, it suppressed the requirement
that there exist a nexus between a crime against humanity and a
crime against peace.135
Of equal importance to the implementation of this legal concept is
the fact that crimes against humanity do not require special intent; 36
indeed, "crimes against humanity differ from genocide in that no
dolus specialis to destroy members of a particular group is required
in case of crimes against humanity."'37 In that respect, the Akayesu
case clearly demonstrates the abandonment of dolus specialis as a
132. See V.M. Jacquart, La Notion de Crime Contre L'Humanit en Droit
International Contemporain et en Droit Canadien 21 RGD 607, 623 (1990).
133. See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, art. 2(1)(c) (Dec. 20, 1945),
3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946) ("Atrocities and
Offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds,
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where
perpetrated."), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtlO.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2004).
134. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 87 (describing the fact that Control
Council Law No. 10 augmented the Nuremberg Charter by adding imprisonment,
torture, and rape to the list of crimes against humanity).
135. See id. at 88 (clarifying that Law No. 10's omission of the words "in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal" eliminated the requirement that a crime against humanity must be
committed in connection with a crime against peace or a war crime).
136. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 565-
68 (Sept. 2, 1998) (differentiating between genocide and crimes against humanity,
and stating that crimes against humanity include murder, extermination,
enslavement, starvation, or deportation of a civilian population, and persecution on
national, racial, religious or political grounds).
137. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 85.
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requirement for the commission of a crime against humanity:
"crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and
are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed
conflict, international or internal in character." '
It is interesting to note that the concept of crimes against humanity
did not exclusively originate from the context of the Nuremberg
trials. In fact, the Paragraph 2 of the Preamble to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
introduced the notion when it referred to "the interests of humanity
and the ever-progressive needs of civilization." 139 Most importantly,
Paragraph 8 of the Preamble, commonly referred to as the Martens
Clause, represents the earliest allusion to such a concept; although
the term "crime against humanity" was not expressly mentioned, the
document stated that "the inhabitants and belligerents remain under
the protection and governance of the principles of the law of nations,
derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, from
the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public
conscience. 1 40 Apparently, there was no intention at that time to
differentiate crimes against humanity from war crimes.
1 41
The Akayesu decision refers to the Martens clause. 142 In addition,
the ICTR pointed out that such terminology was used subsequently
138. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 565 (emphasis added).
139. 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, para. 2.
140. Id. para. 8.
141. See Schwelb, supra note 125, at 180 (describing how the. term in the
Charter was a technical term and noting that, in previous international documents,
the term was considered non-technical).
142. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 566 (noting that early notions
such as the phrases "crimes against mankind" and "crimes against the human
family" also appear); see also Francisco Forrest Martin, Delineating a
Hierarchical Outline of International Law Sources and Norms, 65 SASK. L. REV.
333, 338-39 (2002) (offering the Martens clause as an example of how
international instruments influence other international principles); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
art. 1(2) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,7, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1296-97 (restating the Martens clause
as reading "[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of
the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience").
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in the post-World War I context to denounce the massacre of
Armenian peoples in Turkey. 43 It is thus apparent that the conceptual
roots of crimes against humanity reach back to international
documents predating the Nuremberg era, although the concept
gained strength following World War II. In this respect, it is useful to
analyze briefly how courts have contributed to the evolution of the
definition of this international crime.
In the renowned Eichmann case,144 Otto Adolf Eichmann was
accused of crimes he committed in his capacity as a Nazi superior.145
The Court prosecuted Eichmann under Section I(b) of an Israeli law
which stated that "[c]rime against humanity means any of the
following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political
grounds.' 46 Common elements of the modem definition of crimes
against humanity, as seen in the Rome Statute, for instance, are
easily identifiable in this definition. 47 As mentioned previously, the
Court also declared that a crime against humanity did not require the
special intent (dolus specialis) to target a specific group. 48 Eichmann
143. See id., para. 565 (acknowledging that the concept of crimes against
humanity were recognized before Nuremberg by explaining that on 28 May 1915,
the Governments of France, Great Britain and Russia denounced the massacres of
the Armenian population in Turkey as "crimes against humanity and civilization
for which all the members of the Turkish government will be held responsible
together with its agents implicated in the massacres"); see also Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law Pamphlet No.
32, Report Presented to the preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on
the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties
(1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95 (1920) [hereinafter 1919 Commission
Report] (referencing the violations against the laws of humanity in the course of
describing those whom the tribunal shall adjudicate).
144. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dec. 11, 1961).
145. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T para. 568 (explaining that Eichmann was
charged under Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law "for his participation in the
implementation of the plan know as the Final Solution of the Jewish problem.").
146. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 30.
147. Compare id., with Rome Statute, supra note 1 (finding that both have
comparable and compatible definitions of crimes against humanity).
148. See Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 41 (explaining the irrelevance of the fact that
Eichmann's crime was against the Jewish people).
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was eventually sentenced to death, after his appeal was declined by
the Supreme Court of Israel.1
4 9
The relationship between crimes against humanity and intent was
further developed in the Barbie case,5 0 in which a former-superior of
the Gestapo was tried for deporting and executing civilians. 5' The
French Court of Cassation proposed a definition of crimes against
humanity which effectively broadened the intent element 52 and
149. See Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 341-2 (May 29,
1962) (concluding that when the Israeli Legislature allowed the death sentence to
stand, they could not have imagined a criminal more deserving of it than
Eichmann).
150. Fdration Nationale des D~port~s et Intems R~sistants et Patriotes and
Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125 (1985).
151. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Case No. IT-94-I-T, ICTY T.
Ch. II, para. 641 (May 7, 1997).
In this case the Chambre d'accusation of the Court of Appeal of Lyons
ordered that an indictment for crimes against humanity be issued against
Klaus Barbie, head of the Gestapo of Lyons during the Second World War,
but only for 'persecutions against innocent Jews,' and held that prosecution
was barred by the statute of limitations for crimes committed by Barbie
against combatants who were members of the Resistance or whom Barbie
thought were members of the Resistance, even if they were Jewish, because
these acts could only constitute war crimes and not crimes against humanity.
The order of the examining magistrate along the same lines was confirmed by
the Cour d'Assises and an appeal was lodged. On appeal the Cour de
Cassation quashed and annulled the judgment in part, holding that members
of the Resistance could be victims of crimes against humanity as long as the
necessary intent for crimes against humanity was present. As the court stated,
'[n]either the driving force which motivated the victims, nor their possible
membership of the Resistance, excludes the possibility that the accused acted
with the element of intent necessary for the commission of crimes against
humanity.' Thus, according to the Cour de Cassation, not only was the
general population considered to be one of a civilian character despite the
presence of Resistance members in its midst but members of the Resistance
themselves could be considered victims of crimes against humanity if the
other requisite elements are met.
Id.
152. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. at 137 (explaining that even war crimes could be
considered crimes against humanity if they were inhumane acts and if the
persecution was committed in a systematic manner in the name of a state
practicing a policy of ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of
their membership of a racial or religious community, but also against the
opponents of that policy, whatever the form of their opposition).
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subsequently affirmed it.'53 Eichmann stated that such a crime did
not require special intent. 54 The Barbie case widened the notion of
intent by suggesting a broad interpretation of the term "civilian
population,"'55 as elaborated in the Eichmann decision and other
international documents previously cited. 56 In Tadic Tr. Chamber II,
the ICTY explained how the French Court proceeded to broaden this
notion of intent, namely by counting members of the French
Resistance as within the "civilian population."'57 From these
decisions, one observes a common wish to create a "catch-all"
definition of crimes against humanity. This impetus would be further
expanded in subsequent cases and, finally, in the Rome Statute.
For instance, the Touvier case involved a high-ranking officer in
the Militia of Lyons.'58 In that decision, the French Court of Appeal
153. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 570
(Sept. 2, 1998) ("The fact that the accused, who had been found guilty of one of
the crimes enumerated in Article 6(c) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, in
perpetrating that crime took part in the execution of a common plan to bring about
the deportation or extermination of the civilian population during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, constituted not a distinct
offence or an aggravating circumstance but rather an essential element of the crime
against humanity, consisting of the fact that the acts charged were performed in a
systematic manner in the name of a State practising by those means a policy of
ideological supremacy.").
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (finding that the intent that
motivated Eichmann to choose a specific race was irrelevant in Eichmann's
prosecution).
155. See geherally Frd~ration Nationale des D~port~s et Intems R~sistants et
Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 136-41 (1985) (overruling the lower
.court's conclusion that Barbie could only be held accountable for crimes against
humanity vis-d-vis those Jews who were non-combatants in the Resistance).
156. See infra notes 248-256 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning
and evolution of the term "civilian population").
157. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Case No. IT-94-I-T, ICTY T.
Ch. II, para. 643 (May 7, 1997) (concluding that "a wide definition of civilian
population, as supported by these sources, is justified. Thus the presence of those
actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization of a
population as civilian and those actively involved in a resistance movement can
qualify as victims of crimes against humanity."). The Court also highlighted the
inherent limitation of a case like Barbie: it is a decision emanating from a national
court. Id. para. 642.
158. See Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, para. 571 (enumerating the relevant facts in the
Touvier case).
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referred to the definition of crimes against humanity elaborated in
Barbie.5 9 It also further defined the policy or plan element, which
would eventually be incorporated in the Rome Statute: "[t]he
specific intent necessary to establish a crime against humanity was
the intention to take part in the execution of a common plan by
committing, in a systematic manner, inhuman acts or persecutions in
the name of a state practicing a policy of ideological supremacy. " 61
The Court held that since Touvier was not acting on behalf of a state
that practiced a policy of ideological supremacy, but in the name of
the "Vichy" State, he was not responsible for crimes against
humanity.1 61 With all due deference, I submit that this argument is
unsound because, as the ICTR noted, the "Vichy" State clearly
collaborated with Nazi Germany, the implementer of precisely such
a policy. 162 In fact, a court eventually recognized that Touvier had
indeed committed crimes against humanity.163
The definition of crimes against humanity developed in Barbie was further
developed in the Touvier case. In that case, the accused, Paul Touvier, had
been a high-ranking officer in the Militia (Milice) of Lyons, which operated
in 'Vichy' France during the German occupation. He was convicted of crimes
against humanity for his role in the shooting of seven Jews at Rillieux on 29
June 1994 as a reprisal for the assassination by members of the Resistance, on
the previous day, of the Minister for Propaganda of the 'Vichy' Government.
Id.
159. See id. para. 572 (specifically citing Barbie in the course of defining crimes
against humanity).
160. Id.
161. See id. para. 573 (declaring that the "Vichy" state was not a state practicing
a policy of ideological supremacy, although it collaborated with Nazi Germany,
which clearly did practice such a policy).
162. See id. (noting that the Nazis represented a state government which
practiced a policy of ideological supremacy).
163. See id. para. 574.
The Court of Cassation allowed appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeal, on the grounds that the crimes committed by the accused had been
committed at the instigation of a Gestapo officer, and to that extent were
linked to Nazi Germany, a State practicing a policy of ideological supremacy
against persons by virtue of their membership of a racial or religious
community. Therefore the crimes could be categorized as crimes against
humanity. Touvier was eventually convicted of crimes against humanity by
the Cour d'Assises des Yvelines on 20 April 1994.
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Although the preceding review of relevant jurisprudence is by no
means extensive, it clearly demonstrates the origins of a modem
definition of crimes against humanity through leading national cases.
For instance, the ITCY followed the Barbie case, one of several
cases on World War II involvement, 6 4 with regard to the definition
of crimes against humanity."65 However, elucidation did not emanate
solely from the above-mentioned decisions at Nuremberg trials or in
Israeli and French courts. In reality, it took nearly a century to
concretely define the notion of crimes against humanity. 166 The
relevant sources associated with this legal concept, whether inspired
by international law 167 or created by national jurisdictions, 68 are too
numerous to list here.
164. See, e.g., Notes and News, HUM. RTs. & U.K. PRACTICE 3.4(2) (Oct. 24,
2002), LEXIS, Legal (excluding U.S.), United Kingdom, Journals.
Maurice Papon, a member of the Vichy administration and a senior civil
servant during the war, was found guilty on 2 April 1998 of aiding and
abetting the unlawful arrest and false imprisonment of Jews who were
deported to Auschwitz in convoys in 1942 and 1944. Such offenses were
crimes against humanity and he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment
and stripped of his civil, civic and family rights. He appealed and argued he
was exempt from the obligation to surrender to custody but the court said that
he had forfeited this. He then fled to Switzerland but the authorities there
ordered him to leave. The Criminal Division of the Cour de Cassation then
declared that he had forfeited his right of appeal.
Id.
165. See Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic et al., Case No. IT-95-13-R6, 528-529
(April 3, 1996).
Although according to the terms of Article 5 of the Statute of this Tribunal
combatants in the traditional sense of the term cannot be victims of a crime
against humanity, this does not apply to individuals who, at one particular
point in time, carried out acts of resistance. As the Commission of Experts,
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780, noted, 'it seems
obvious that Article 5 applies first and foremost to civilians, meaning people
who are not combatants. This, however, should not lead to any quick
conclusions concerning people who at one particular point in time did bear
arms... Information of the overall circumstances is relevant for the
interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its purpose.
Id.
166. See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text (tracing the roots of the
concept of "crime against humanity").
167. See, e.g., Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in
the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess.,
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However, one conclusion emerges: the various elements of the
legal concept of crimes against humanity, whether related to intent,
the policy element, etc., eventually culminated in what is now
Article 7 of the Rome Statute.'69 In fact, rules of customary
international law now fully recognize that crimes against humanity
constitute international offenses. 70 Moreover, perpetrators of such
crimes incur individual criminal responsibility.'17  Some authors
argue that the prohibition of crimes against humanity represents an
"extant or emerging global jus cogens obligation.' 1 72 This writer
fully endorses that proposition. 73 Given their morally reprehensible
and serious character, such crimes should receive particular attention
and should be prosecuted internationally.' 74 This premise does not
seem to generate any controversy and should not, as the international
U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946) (calling on the Committee on the codification of
international law to incorporate the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal in the process of forming an International Criminal Code); see also
Formulation of the Niirnberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 374, 374-
377, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (describing the process by which the
principles were formulated and stating the final principles agreed upon).
168. See infra notes 227-231 and accompanying text (describing the impact the
Supreme Court of Canada has had on the development of the mens rea
requirement for crimes against humanity).
169. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (detailing what is included under the
definition of crimes against humanity).
170. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (highlighting the growing
consensus among nations that universality supercedes territoriality when it comes
to prosecuting crimes against humanity).
171. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 141 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting
that the ICTY had jurisdiction to hear the case against the defendant, in part,
because there exists no requirement that a crime against humanity must be
committed in the course of an armed internal or international conflict).
172. Martin, supra note 142, at 346.
173. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 60-61 (2d ed. 1999) (emphasizing the growing importance of
"crimes against humanity" in the global sphere, and tracing the origin of the term
to the Hague Convention, where the words were intended to "provide an
overarching concept to protect against unspecified violations whose identification
in positive international law was left to future normative development").
174. See generally Micaela Frulli, Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious
Than War Crimes? 12 EUR. J. INT'L LAw 329 (2001) (opining that crimes against
humanity are often considered more serious than war crimes), available at
http://www.ejil.org/journa1!Vol 12/No2/120329.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
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community established the ICC in an effort to suppress such
deplorable conduct.'75 As I have already argued, the separate
category of crimes against humanity is not necessarily exclusive of
certain terrorist acts.'76 In addition, I also previously underlined that
many international jurists support my argument. I now focus on the
crimes committed by members of Al Qaeda as they pertain to the
Rome Statute. In this regard, I intend to demonstrate how the acts of
September 11 th qualify as crimes against humanity, in that they meet
all of the requisite elements under Article 7.177
Before initiating an analysis of the aforementioned provision, I
propose to look briefly at the notion of crimes against humanity as
elaborated by the ICTR and ICTY. Although this paper sets out to
analyze the legal requirements under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, it
is essential to review the statutory provisions governing these
international tribunals with regard to crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, in light of the glaring fact that the ICC has yet to
produce a single decision, I will invoke ICTY and ICTR
jurisprudence in analyzing different elements under the Rome
Statute. However, one caveat is mandatory: the doctrine of binding
precedent, or stare decisis, is inapplicable in this international
context. 78 Hence, one must avoid the temptation to read the legal
175. See German Embassy, Purpose of the ICC (quoting Chancellor Gerhard
Schr6der as having said that "[t]he International Court nourishes my hope that in
the future the worst violations of international law such as genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes will not go unpunished."), at
http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/ICC/purpose.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
176. See, e.g., Debbie Berman, Amnesty International: Palestinian Terror is
Crime Against Humanity, ISRAELINSIDER, July 11, 2002 (describing Amnesty
International's classification of Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens as a
crime against humanity), http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/2002/07/11/32325.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
177. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (listing acts which, when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population,
would constitute crimes against humanity).
178. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 50 (stating that "[i]n any case,
international tribunals are not bound by past doctrines; they must apply customary
international law as it stands at the time of the commission of offences."); see also
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 654 (Oct. 2, 1995) (demonstrating that
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principles I extract from these tribunals or any other international
body as directly binding on the ICC. 179 This jurisprudence
nevertheless remains instrumental to the following analysis of the
Rome Statute.
D. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Following a report by the Secretary General of the United Nations,
the Security Council adopted the Statute for the International
there is no binding precedent between these judicial bodies). The Trial Chamber II
of the ICTY rejected the notion of crimes against humanity as conceived at the
time of World War II, insisting on the interpretation applicable at the time the
offenses were perpetrated.
An additional issue concerns the nature of the entity behind the policy. The
traditional conception was, in fact, not only that a policy must be present but
that the policy must be that of a State, as was the case in Nazi Germany. The
prevailing opinion was, as explained by one commentator, that crimes against
humanity, as crimes of a collective nature, require a State policy 'because
their commission requires the use of the state's institutions, personnel and
resources in order to commit, or refrain from preventing the commission of,
the specified crimes described in Article 6(c) [of the Ndirnberg Charter].
Id; see also Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank, [1977] Q.B. 529 (Jan.
13, 1997) (asserting the notion that stare decisis does not apply to international
law). In doing so, the Court effectively reversed the decision rendered by the
British Court of Appeals in Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of
Pakistan. In that regard, Judge Shaw eloquently stated:
[t]his reductio ad absurdum carries the suggestion that there must be a flaw in
the argument which leads to the incidence of stare decisis. May it not be that
the true principle as to the application of international law is that the English
courts must at any given time discover what the prevailing international rule
is and apply that rule? This is not the same process as applying foreign law in
my courts for that only comes into question when for a particular reason the
proper law relating to the matter before the court is that foreign law. In the
case of international law it is always part of the law to be applied irrespective
of any intention or agreement of the parties in suit. This, so it seems to me, is
the true distinction and not that the one is immutable as a rule of law while
the other is always subject to investigation as a question of fact.
Id.
179. See MARK JENNINGS, THE PROCEDURAL REGIME OF THE INTERNTIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 5 (explaining that the Rome Statute does not obligate the Court
to adhere to its prior decisions, but rather permits the judges, in their discretion, to
accord precedential value to principles and rules of law identified in prior
decisions), available at http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Jennings.pdf (last visited Mar.
28, 2004).
2004] RETHINKING THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICC 1053
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.18 0 The relevant
provision is contained in Article 5 and reiterates some elements I
reviewed previously, such as the requirement that the crime be
"directed against any civilian population;" it reads as follows:
ARTICLE 5
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population:
murder;
extermination;
enslavement;
deportation;
imprisonement;
torture;
rape;
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
other inhumane acts.
181
From the statute itself, it is apparent that the moving party must
prove a nexus between the alleged crime against humanity and an
"armed conflict" before the ICTY. In other words, there must be a
geographical and temporal link between the acts of the accused and
an armed conflict. In light of the factual and historical background of
the conflict in former Yugoslavia, this threshold seems easy to
surmount.'82 In addition, the type and nature of such an armed
180. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, Supp. No. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993) (reporting on all aspects of the establishment of an international tribunal in
the former Yugoslavia).
181. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
as amended by UN Security Council Resolution 1411 (2002) of 17 May 2002
(U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411) (2002) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
182. Roots of the Balkan Troubles: A History of Ethnic Skirmishes, CNN
(providing a short history of the conflict in the Balkans), at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/history (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
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conflict is irrelevant18 3 and the alleged crime does not even have to
fit into an official policy or practice.8 4 However, as will be
demonstrated,1 15 this jurisdictional limitation does not reflect the
state of customary international law.1 16 The ITCY has recognized
183. See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, para. 545
(Jan. 14, 2000) ("By requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council, in establishing the
International Tribunal, may have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly
than is necessary under customary international law. It is nevertheless sufficient for
the purposes of Article 5 that the act occurred in the course or duration of any
armed conflict. The type and nature of such conflict - whether international or
internal - is therefore immaterial. An armed conflict can be said to exist whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State. The nature of the nexus required under Article 5 of the
Statute is merely that the act be linked geographically as well as temporally with
the armed conflict."); see also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-
T, para. 71, (Mar. 3, 2000) (taking the same position).
184. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 573 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("It is
not, however, necessary to show that armed conflict was occurring at the exact
time and place of the proscribed acts alleged to have occurred, as the Appeals
Chamber has indicated, nor is it necessary that the crime alleged takes place during
combat, that it be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or tolerated
by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of a
policy associated with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the
conflict; the obligations of individuals under international humanitarian law are
independent and apply without prejudice to any questions of the responsibility of
States under international law. The only question, to be determined in the
circumstances of each individual case, is whether the offences were closely related
to the armed conflict as a whole."); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic,
Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 195 (November 16, 1998) [hereinafter
Celibici case] (asserting the same position).
185. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (addressing this issue
extensively, and citing relevant jurisprudence and doctrine).
186. It would be interesting to contrast this idea with the notion that, under
customary international law, crimes against humanity do not require to be linked
with any conflict at all, as expressed in Tadic Jurisdiction Decision. However, on
this very opinion expressed in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, Penny warns that
"[i]t must be cautioned, however, that this ICTFY argument is also obiter dicta."
C.K. Penny, 'No Justice, No Peace?': A Political and Legal Analysis of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 30 OTTAWA L. REV.
259, 311-12 n.275 (1999); see also KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 89 (citing
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, but not providing the same caveat, stating instead that
"crimes against humanity under customary international law need not be linked to
international armed conflict, as required in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, or
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this, '8 and many authors accordingly support the abandonment of
the "armed conflict" element. 8 ' The "armed conflict" requirement
serves the purpose of defining the ratione materiae of the ICTY, and
does not constitute an additional element of the mens rea.189 This
any conflict at all"); see also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
para. 251 (July 15, 1999) (recognizing that customary international law does not
require the nexus between the alleged acts and an armed conflict: "[t]hus the
"attack on the civilian population" is here equated to "the armed conflict"). The
two concepts cannot, however, be identical because crimes against humanity
would, by definition, always take place in armed conflict, whereas under
customary international law these crimes may also be committed in times of peace.
So the two-the "attack on the civilian population" and "the armed conflict"-must
be separate notions, although of course under Article 5 of the Statute, the attack on
"any civilian population" may be part of an "armed conflict." A nexus with the
accused's acts is required, however, only for the attack on "any civilian population.
A nexus between the accused's acts and the armed conflict is not required, as is
instead suggested by the Judgment. The armed conflict requirement is satisfied by
proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in so
doing, it requires more than does customary international law." Id.; see also
Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, para. 573-77 (taking the same position).
187. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran
Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, ICTY App. Ch., para. 81 (June 12
2002) (outlining the respondent's argument that the alleged perpetrator of a crime
against humanity need not approve of a plan to target the civilian population or
personally desire its outcome, but that it is sufficient for the acts to be intentionally
carried out within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population, with knowledge of the context in which these crimes fit, and
full awareness that their actions would contribute to the attack); see also supra
note 171 and accompanying text (explaining the holding of the court in Tadic,
which stated that it is not necessary to show that armed conflict was occurring at
the exact time and place of the alleged acts, only that the offenses were closely
related to the armed conflict as a whole).
188. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation
of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 242 (1996) ("The
Tribunal's affirmation that crimes against humanity can be committed in
peacetime is of major importance.").
189. See Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, para. 249.
[t]he Appeals Chamber would also agree with the Prosecution that the words
'committed in armed conflict' in Article 5 of the Statute require nothing more
than the existence of an armed conflict at the relevant time and place. The
Prosecution is, moreover, correct in asserting that the armed conflict
requirement is a jurisdictional element, not "a substantive element of the
mens rea of crimes against humanity" (i.e., not a legal ingredient of the
subjective element of the crime.
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distinction has the practical effect of doing away with the
requirement that parties prove a nexus between the alleged acts and
an armed conflict. 190 Therefore, the current state of customary
international law does not require a nexus between crimes against
humanity and an armed conflict.
E. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
The Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR Statute") incorporates an enumeration of the same crimes
against humanity found under the ICTY Statute. 191 However, it
diverges from the latter in two fundamental aspects: first, it "does
away with the requirement in the ICTY Statute that such crimes be
committed in armed conflict,"' 92 and second, it adds a discriminatory
element to ICTR jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. This
second element is of primary importance, as it limits the
geographical jurisdiction of the ICTR. Article 3 of the ICTR Statute
is the essential provision in this regard, and reads as follows:
ARTICLE 3
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
190. See id. para. 272 (holding that the requirement that an act must not have
been carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator does not
constitute one of the prerequisites necessary for conduct to fall within the
definition of a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute);
see also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 66-68 (Mar.
3, 2000) (maintaining that, in order to show that a link exists between an alleged
crime and an armed conflict as a whole, it is sufficient that "the alleged crimes
were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories
controlled by the parties to the conflict").
191. See Sec. Council Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (establishing the tribunal's power to prosecute persons responsible for
certain enumerated crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or
religious grounds).
192. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 89.
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Murder;
Extermination;
Enslavement;
Deportation;
Imprisonement;
Torture;
Rape;
Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
Other inhumane acts. 
193
Hence, the ICTR Statute introduces the notion of "discriminatory
intent,"' 94 which requires that a crime against humanity must be
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds" in order to fall within ICTR jurisdiction. In other words,
the prosecution must establish that the alleged crime was perpetrated
on the basis of a policy of persecution, a threshold easily surpassed
in the factual context of the Rwandan conflict.
In the Kayishema case, the ICTR cited the additional
discriminatory element. 195 Like the required nexus between a crime
against humanity and an "armed conflict" under the ICTY Statute,
193. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
194. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 89 ("Thus, the ICTR Statute
contains a requirement of discriminatory intent in each of the enumerated crimes
against humanity additional to the other requirements in the Nuremberg Charter,
the Tokyo Charter, and the ICTY Statute.").
195. Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
para. 130 (May, 21 1999).
The Statute contains a requirement additional to both the Nuremberg Charter
and the ICTY Statute; that the attack be committed on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds. The Prosecution submits that the
discrimination at issue was based on ethnic or, alternatively, political
grounds. The Prosecution asserted that the discrimination was on ethnic
grounds because the victims were Tutsis and political grounds because the
Tutsis were accomplices or supporters of the RPF. The Defence did not
contest that the Tutsis were considered an ethnic group. Political grounds
include party political beliefs and political ideology.
Id.
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this additional "discriminatory intent element" under ICTR
jurisdiction does not reflect the state of customary international
law. 196 This additional "discriminatory intent element" is essential in
that it was integrally transposed into the Rome Statute, along with
the policy or plan element. In fact, under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute, a crime against humanity must be "committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population" and
can translate into "persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds."'' 97
F. REQUISITE ELEMENTS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT'S JURISDICTION
As I have already indicated, Article 7 of the Rome Statute is the
provision that concerns crimes against humanity. 98 In addition to
196. See id. para. 138 (confirming, with regard to both the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes that "the ICTR and ICTY Statutes did not reflect customary international
law at the time of drafting. This is evident by the inclusion of the need for an
armed conflict in the ICTY Statute and the inclusion of the requirement that the
crimes be committed with discriminatory intent in the ICTR Statute").
197. See, e.g., id. para. 130 (indicating that someone's political beliefs or
ideology could be the object of persecution and thereby meet the "discriminatory
intent" requirement under Article 3); see also Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 583-84 (Sept. 2, 1998) (pointing out that certain
acts falling outside the scope of persecution could be qualified as crimes against
humanity if perpetrated with the purpose of furthering other crimes against
humanity).
Inhumane acts committed against persons not falling within any one of the
discriminatory categories could constitute crimes against humanity if the
perpetrator's intention was to further his attacks on the group discriminated
against on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 3 of the Statute. The
perpetrator must have the requisite intent for the commission of crimes
against humanity.
Id.
198. For a legislative history of the crimes under Article 7, see H. von Hebel &
D. Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE- ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 79, 90-103 (R.S. Lee ed. 1999) (providing the background for Article 7
and the three negotiating pressures that influenced the definition of crimes against
humanity). Those negotiating pressures were: 1) the state's concerns that other
states could potentially use the law on crimes against humanity to infringe upon
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listing a series of actual crimes such as murder and extermination,
Article 7 also states that the alleged crime must be "committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack" in order to fall
under ICC jurisdiction. 99 Article 7 integrates various developments
of international law since World War 11.200 Moreover, the Rome
Statute imports the "discriminatory intent element" found under the
ICTR Statute.2 °1 I next review the requisite elements under Article 7
and study the aspects of the crime of murder as they apply to acts
perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda.11
1. Actus Reus
Under the Rome Statute, the actus reus requirement of any crime
against humanity is fairly straightforward. It may be summarized as
amounting to the "commission of an attack that is inhumane in
nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury to
national sovereignty; 2) state commitments to an expansive and feasible definition;
and 3) pressure for a high level of accuracy. Id.
199. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.
200. See Darryl Robinson, Defining "crimes against humanity" at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (1999) (explaining that the brutalities of
World War II challenged the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter in 1945 to
criminalize the "policy of atrocities and persecutions against civilian populations"
who were not of enemy states, and thus which did not always fit the technical
definition of war crimes). The drafters designated such atrocities as "crimes
against humanity." Id.
201. See discussion infra Part II.E (describing how the ICTR Statute supplies an
additional requirement, absent from the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTY Statute,
that a perpetrator must have committed an attack on national, political, ethnic,
racial or religious grounds).
202. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 578 (citing that before the
Rome Statute, the ICTR broke crimes against humanity down into four common
elements). These elements follow:
(i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health; (ii) the act must be
committed as part of a wide spread or systematic attack; (iii) the act must be
committed against members of the civilian population;
(iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds,
namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
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body or mental or physical health."2 °3 Furthermore, the "inhumane
act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against members of a civilian population."2°4 These principal
ingredients20 5 make up the general actus reus required for ICC
jurisdiction. Four distinct elements must be present: i) an attack; ii) a
nexus between the specific crimes and the attack; iii) the attack must
be committed against any civilian population; and iv) the attack must
be committed on a widespread or systematic basis.2"6 These specific
actus reus elements will be discussed in greater detail in following
sections.2" 7 Prima facie, the attacks carried out by members of Al
Qaeda on September 1 1th satisfy the threshold physical action
requirement. °8
203. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 90-91 (explaining that the Rome
Statute reveals developments in international humanitarian law that followed
World War II with the addition of 1) "forcible transfer of population" as a
substitute for deportation; 2) "severe deprivation of physical liberty" as included
within imprisonment; 3) sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
and enforced sterilization as incorporated in sexual offenses; 4) the requirement
that persecution is aimed on discriminatory grounds "against any identifiable
group collectivity; 5) disappearance of persons; and 6) apartheid).
204. Id.
205. See Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, para.
67 (1999) (specifying that the actus reus must be more than a random inhumane
act). Customary international law requires that the actus reus must be committed
either in a widespread or systematic nature, but does not necessarily require both
conditions to be present. Id. para. 68; see also Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema,
ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 204 (2000) (characterizing "widespread" as
a "massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against multiple victims" and" systematic" as "organized
action, following a regular pattern, on the basis of a common policy and involves
substantial public or private resources").
206. See Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 205 (stipulating that an attack
may also be non-violent). Imposing a system of apartheid is an example of a non-
violent attack that the Rome Statute considers a crime against humanity. Id.
207. See discussion infra Part II.F.4 (analyzing each element individually to
determine whether the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda, once dissected into
separate composite elements of the actus reus, did fulfill the requirements under
the Rome Statute).
208. See id. (illustrating how the acts that Al Qaeda perpetrated on September
11 th meet the requirements of actus reus for crimes against humanity).
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2. Mens Rea
In addition to the mens rea required for an ordinary crime,2"9 the
Rome Statute contains a specific requirement with regard to the
mental element of any crime against humanity: the perpetrator of the
crime must have knowledge that attack that is being carried out on a
widespread or systematic basis.210 Both the ICTR and the ICTY have
indicated that either "actual" or "constructive" knowledge that the
alleged attack is being perpetrated on such a basis and pursuant to
such a policy or plan is sufficient to meet this requirement.2 ' In other
209. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712, 999 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines mens
rea as
[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove
that the defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or
recklessness ... Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every
crime at common law, the other being the actus reus. - Also termed mental
element; criminal intent; guilty mind.
Id.
210. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 91 (expounding that without
knowledge, the perpetrator would not have the mens rea for a crime against
humanity, but merely would possess the mens rea for an ordinary crime).
211. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-
95-1-T, para. 133 (May, 21. 1999) (confirming the requirement that the accused
must have acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack with the
wording of Article 7 in the Rome Statute); see also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, paras. 656-57 (Oct. 2, 1995) (citing to the judgment in the Canadian
case, Regina v. Finta, and stating that "[tlhe mental element required to be proved
to constitute a crime against humanity is that the accused was aware of or willfully
blind to facts or circumstances which would bring his or her acts within crimes
against humanity. However, it would not be necessary to establish that the accused
knew that his actions were inhumane."); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-A, para. 271 (July 15, 1999) (establishing that crimes against humanity are of
a special nature, involve a higher degree of moral depravity than ordinary crimes,
and thus require express elements); Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case
No. ICTR-96-3-T, para. 69 (1999) (reinforcing the notion that the accused must
have acted with a preconceived policy, which the state of the accused need not
have adopted formally); Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-
T, paras. 56-57 (Jan. 14, 2000) (reiterating the elements of mens rea for crimes
against humanity); Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 206 (concurring with
the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgments that a perpetrator must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the expansive setting of the attack); Prosecutor v.
Georges Ruggiu, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, para.20 (2000) (assenting with
the Tadic and Kayishema tribunals that proving mens rea for crimes against
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words, the accused must have a sense of the broader overall context
in which the crime is being committed,2t 2 and that such an offense
fits into a context of mass crimes or within a pattern of similar
offenses targeting civilian populations."1 3 In sum,
[t]he perpetrator must knowingly commit crimes against humanity in the
sense that he must understand the overall context of his act ... to be
guilty of crimes against humanity the perpetrator must know that there is
an attack on a civilian population and that his act is part of the attack.' 14
Much jurisprudence has been written about the notion of criminal
state of mind, and more precisely, about a perpetrator's "knowledge
of a given attack. '' 2 5 Generally, the ITCR has established that a
tribunal will examine a perpetrator's knowledge of an attack on an
objective level, that is, based upon what can be implied from the
circumstances of the alleged crime. 1 6 Hence, a tribunal will find an
accused responsible for crimes against humanity based solely on
their understanding of his or her knowledge of the attack and of the
broader context in which the specific attack occurred; the
humanity is arduous and controversial); KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 91
(expressing that tribunals will judge knowledge on an objective level, applying the
factual circumstances of the case). In judging the prerequisite knowledge for a
crime against humanity, the accused need not know what will happen to the
victims and the tribunal need not prove that the accused knew of the plan, merely
that the accused took a risk that the crime could be committed. Id.
212. See Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, para. 656 ("[T]herefore in addition to
the intent to commit the underlying offence the perpetrator must know of the
broader context in which his act occurs."); see also KITTICHAISAREE, supra note
56, at 93 (justifying the proposition that the act must be committed "with
knowledge of the attack" in order to differentiate unrelated events that have no
connection with the crime at issue and would not be a crime against humanity).
213. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 244-50
(Mar. 3, 2000) (relying on the Kayishema and Ruzindana cases to demonstrate that
the perpetrator must know that his act is part of the attack on a civilian population).
214. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T, para. 133.
215. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 92 (illuminating that the tribunal
need not prove the motive of the accused, besides at the sentencing stage). In
addition, having committed a crime with personal motives will not acquit the
accused if his act fits the pattern of a crime against humanity. Id.
216. See id. (citing historical and political circumstances, the perpetrator's
responsibilities in the political or military hierarchy, the breadth and seriousness of
the acts, and the nature of the crimes as objective facts with which the tribunal may
examine a perpetrator's knowledge).
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perpetrator's knowledge with regard to the fate of the civilian
population that is being targeted is immaterial to the analysis.217
Similarly, the accused's motives are irrelevant to the tribunal's
assessment of his or her knowledge of the attack.218 Consequently,
the prosecution does not have to establish that the accused actually
knew of the criminal policy or plan behind the alleged criminal
acts.219 In reality, "it suffices that, through the functions he willingly
accepted, he knowingly took the risk of participating in the
implementation of that context. ' 220 The fact that the accused took a
deliberate risk that the crime might follow, even if he harbored a
hope that no damage or harm would ensue from the attack, would
fulfill the "actual" or "constructive" knowledge element.22'
217. See Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, para. 659.
Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these
acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit
his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the
civilian population, that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against
humanity. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the
civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the act must
not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.
Id.
218. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 252 (July 15,
1999) (explaining that, although an act related to armed conflict is not committed
for purely personal motives, nor is an act unrelated to armed conflict necessarily
committed for purely personal reasons). A perpetrator may commit a crime against
humanity for purely personal reasons, as long as he knew of and committed the
crime in the context of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian
population. Id. para. 255. Although motives are initially irrelevant in criminal law,
they can become relevant in mitigating or aggravating a convicted perpetrator's
sentence. Id. paras. 267, 269.
219. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 91 (specifying that the accused
must possess knowledge that his acts contributed to a broader context of mass
crimes).
220. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 251 (Mar.
3, 2000) (qualifying the knowledge required for a perpetrator to be found to have
met the mens rea element of a crime against humanity). The ICTY feels that an
accused who participated in the charge of a mass crime in a leadership capacity
should have questioned the malicious intent of the crimes. Id. para. 253.
221. See id. para. 254 (rejecting the notion that the ICTY should require proof
that the accused intended to support the regime that orchestrated the atrocious
acts). Although it is unnecessary for the Tribunal to prove intent, indirect
malicious intent or recklessness may still be present. Id.; see also KITTICHAISAREE,
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In the Blaskic case, the ICTY Trial Chamber analyzed the scenario
in which a person voluntarily assumes political or military functions
in collaboration with the author of the plan, policy, or organization
under scrutiny.222  Many factors warranted consideration in
establishing whether that person had effectively participated in the
plan, even if that person had collaborated only periodically with the
author of the policy.223 In order to demonstrate that this person had
knowledge that he or she carried out his or her functions,
collaboration, and participation as part of a greater context or plan
leading to the commission of crimes against humanity, the ICTY
suggested an analytical framework based on a multi-factor, fact-
driven approach.224 The facts that bear consideration in such an
inquiry go towards the historical and political circumstances in
which the acts of violence occurred, the functions the accused was
carrying out when the crimes were committed, his or her
responsibilities within the political or military hierarchy, the direct
and indirect relationship between the political and military hierarchy,
the scope and gravity of the acts perpetrated, the nature of the crimes
committed, and the degree to which they perpetration of the crimes
was common knowledge.225 These factors act as guidelines for courts
addressing the political or military collaboration element, such as the
ITCY Trial Chamber in the Blaskic case.226
supra note 56, at 91 (referring to the proper extent of the perpetrator's awareness
for the transformation of a crime into a crime against humanity).
222. See Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 660 (finding that when General
Blaskic agreed to be the Kiseijak region military commander and the Central
Bosnia Operative Zone commander, he subscribed to the policy of the Croatian
military and political authorities in persecuting Muslim populations).
223. See id. para. 661 (establishing that General Blaskic ordered attacks in April
and June of 1993 in the Kiseljak region against Muslim villages and had to have
known that violent crimes would unavoidably occur as a result of such orders).
224. See id. paras. 258-59 (notingh that a tribunal can deduce the mens rea for a
crime against humanity by framing the knowledge of the political context using a
set of material facts).
225. See id. (proffering examples of concrete facts that judges seek as evidence
in determining the circumstances of the case). There is no explicit requirement that
perpetrators of an attack must have committed acts with racial, national, religious,
or political animus. Id. para. 260.
226. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 92 (citing the summary of the
judgment in Blas/dc that the President of the Trial Chamber I of the ICTY read).
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Finally, the Finta decision is of crucial importance to an
understanding of the mens rea requirement under Article 7 of the
Rome Statute.227 International tribunals have followed the decision in
dealing with the component referred to as "knowledge of the
attack." '28 Writing on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada, Justice Cory indicated that there must be an element of
subjective knowledge on the part of the accused, a groundbreaking
approach to analyzing the knowledge element.229 The Finta Court
went on to reject willful blindness as a defense where particular
actions should evidently constitute crimes against humanity.230 In
sum, the accused must have some sense that his or her actions are
Thus, the accused in Blaskic was found to be part of a design whose purpose
was the persecution of the Muslim population because of his political will to
get involved with the Croat defence council known as the HVO which had
military and civilian structures. The HVO took decisions on the organization
of life in the town, and, as such, the accused, who was a general, was deemed
to be perfectly aware that the scope of his activities was not and could not be
a strictly military one, and to be aware of the policy of discrimination against
Muslims to systematically exlude them from the organs of political life.
Id.
227. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (specifying crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC such as murder, extermination, enslavement, etc., all of
which require a "knowledge of the attack").
228. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (July 15, 1999)
(providing an example of how the ICTY has followed Canada's ruling).
229. See Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, 819 (1994) (emphasizing that the mens
rea requirement does not require the perpetrator to know that such actions were
inhumane).
230. See id.
These cases make it clear that in order to constitute a crime against humanity
or a war crime, there must be an element of subjective knowledge on the part
of the accused of the factual conditions which render the actions a crime
against humanity. Thus, for all of the reasons set out earlier, I am in
agreement with the majority of the Court of Appeal's assessment that the
mental element of a crime against humanity must involve an awareness of the
facts or circumstances which would bring the acts within the definition of a
crime against humanity. However, I emphasize it is not necessary to establish
that the accused knew that his or her actions were inhumane. . . Similarly, for
war crimes, the Crown would have to establish that the accused knew or was
aware of the facts or circumstances that brought his or her actions within the
definition of a war crime.
Id.
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objectively shocking to generally-accepted principles of humanity, or
that they constitute an affront to universal moral conscience.2 1'
This analysis is easily transferable to the acts perpetrated by
members of Al Qaeda on September 11 th.2 The admitted purpose of
the attacks was to strike at symbols of the Western world, such as the
WTC and the Pentagon, while murdering civilians in the process.233
Those responsible hoped to use these acts as a vehicle for their
message, and were objectively aware that such acts would induce a
climate of terror, as well as causing the destruction of human life.3
Using the media to show the world that it was a force to be reckoned
with, Al Qaeda obviously intended these murders as proof of its
reach and presence.3
3. Nexus with an Armed Conflict
There is no requirement to prove a nexus between a crime against
humanity and an armed conflict under Article 7 of the Rome
Statute. 36
231. See id. (noting that in order to establish mens rea, the accused would have
to be aware that the facts or circumstances of his or her actions were such that,
viewed objectively, they would shock the conscience of all right-thinking
individuals; alternatively, the mens rea requirement of both crimes against
humanity and war crimes would be met if it were established that the accused was
willfully blind to the facts or circumstances that would bring his or her actions
within the provisions of these offenses).
232. See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 7 (asserting that the events surrounding
September 11 th undoubtedly satisfy the "knowledge of the attack" element). The
article also compares genocide and war crimes to crimes against humanity in the
context of international law. Id. at 5.
233. See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF
TERROR 89 (Columbia University Press 2002) (explaining that Al Qaeda's long-
term strategy was to build an alliance of Islamic states to wage war against the
United States).
234. See id. at 91 (noting that Osama bin Laden "makes no pretence about his
strategy of using terror as an instrument"). The author also states that terror is only
one of Al Qaeda's tactics--other strategies include the politicization and
radicalization of Muslims. Id. at 92.
235. See id. at 91 (referring to an anti-United States poster, which read, "the
non-Muslim world should know it well that a Muslim is always ready to die in the
name of God").
236. See generally Meron, supra note 188 (asserting that crimes against
humanity do not require a connection to an international armed conflict).
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4. Specific Requirements under the Rome Statute
a. Attack
Article 7 of the Rome Statute requires that a physical attack be
perpetrated.237 In addition, Article 7(2)(a) defines the term "attack
directed against any civilian population" as "a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
state or organizational policy to commit such attack. '238 Hence, the
attacks of September 1 1th were a physical event involving the
commission of enumerated crimes against humanity under Article
7.239
b. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
Because the Al Qaeda network claimed responsibility for
hijacking four planes and crashing three of them into the WTC and
the Pentagon, the "attack" element of Article 7 is easily met.
2 40 I
submit that the events of September 11 th did not form part of an
isolated account or episode. In fact, Al Qaeda is widely known to
have perpetrated other acts of terrorism. 241 With regard to the
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (specifying examples of attacks,
including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, and rape).
238. See von Hebel and Robinson, supra note 198, at 95 (noting that "multiple
commission of acts" does not require more than one enumerated crime against
humanity).
239. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-
T, para. 122 (May, 21 1999); Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-T, para. 68 (1999) (finding that, in both of these cases, the ICTR has
stated that the attack cannot be perpetrated for purely personal motives). But see
Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, 819 (1994) (holding that the accused's motives are
now irrelevant to the analysis).
240. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (requiring attacks to be "widespread
and systematic").
241. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (referring to the 1998 bombing
of U.S. embassies in Africa).
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application of Article 7(2), this author is of the view that the
hijackers committed over 3000 individual acts of murder.242
c. Nexus Between Specific Crimes and Attack
This portion of Article 7 sets forth another requirement that does
not generate much controversy.243 Essentially, the alleged crimes
must be perpetrated in relation to widespread or systematic attacks
on a civilian population.244
d. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
The acts perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda were part of a
systematic campaign against U.S. civilian populations.245 There is
also a direct link between the September 1lth hijackings and the
242. See T.M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 66 (New York: Cambridge University Press 2002),
(asserting that, although the final death toll following the attacks of September
1lth is not accurate, some sources suggest that more than 5,000 civilians were
killed).
243. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (requiring that the attacks be
perpetrated against a civilian population).
244. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 271 (July 15,
1999).
Crimes which are unrelated to widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian
population should not be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Crimes
against humanity are crimes of a special nature to which a greater degree of
moral turpitude attaches than to an ordinary crime. Thus to convict an
accused of crimes against humanity, it must be proved that the crimes were
related to the attack on a civilian population and that the accused knew that
his crimes were so related.
Id.
245. See Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic,
Case No. IT-96-23., para. 100 (June 12, 2002) (specifying a relatively low
threshold for what is deemed a "systematic attack"). The Kunarac court held that:
[t]he acts of the accused must be part of the "attack" against the civilian
population, but they need not be committed in the midst of that attack. A
crime which is committed before or after the main attack against the civilian
population or away from it could still, if sufficiently connected, be part of that
attack. The crime must not, however, be an isolated act. A crime would be
regarded as an "isolated act" when it is so far removed from that attack that,
having considered the context and circumstances in which it was committed,
it cannot reasonably be said to have been part of the attack.
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overall campaigns that Al Qaeda directed against Israel and U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia. 46 Above all, these specific crimes converge
into a greater objective, an ongoing, globaljihad aimed, among other
things, at expelling infidels from Saudi soil.
247
e. Committed Against Any Civilian Population
This element is relatively straightforward: there must be a nexus
between the acts of the accused and the attack on the civilian
population. 48 It is accepted law that the term "civilian" must be
given a broad definition to cover the general population but also
members of the armed forces or resistance forces who are hors de
combat at the time of the attack.2 49 The key factor in determining a
246. See GUNARATNA, supra note 233, at 86-88 (explaining that Middle Eastern
ideologues used the concept of jihad primarily against Israel and the Jews). Al
Qaeda also believes that until U.S. troops are ejected from Saudi Arabia, Muslim
society will be "living a life of sin." Id. To appeal to the Muslim masses, Osama
bin Laden is likely to use the same argument regarding U.S. troops in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Id.
247. See id. at 84 (discussing Al Qaeda's ideology). The author makes several
important observations, which are interesting here:
[t]o understand the mind-set of Al Qaeda's volunteers one must appreciate
their belief system and the group's ideology, which is founded on Islamism
and the pursuit of jihad. Various Islamists, including Al Qaeda, have
misinterpreted-or at times reinterpreted-jihad as 'holy war.' Lexically jihad
is the exertion of one's utmost effort in order to attain a goal or to repel
something detestable... The principal aims ofjihad are to remove oppression
and injustice; to establish justice, well-being and prosperity; and to eliminate
barriers to the spread of truth... Osama never interpreted Islam to assist a
given political goal. Islam is his political goal, his rhetoric, philanthropy
toward the Muslim poor and military support for oppressed Muslims having
great resonance among young Muslims the world over, including those living
in the West who found it difficult adapting to, and integrating with, their new
environment.
Id.; see also NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD 7-8 (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux 2003) (providing a brief history of Islamicjihad from the late 1970s to
the present).
248. See Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-A, para. 251 (holding that one must view an
"attack on any civilian population" and "armed conflict" as separate notions, and
that a nexus for the crime is required only for an attack on a civilian population).
249. See KiTTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 95 (emphasizing that the situation
faced by the victim at the time of the crime must be evaluated when determining
"civilian status"); see also Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras. 626 & 641-
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victim's "civilian status" lies in an assessment of his or her status at
the time the crimes were perpetrated.5 0 Although the majority of the
targeted "population" must be civilian, courts have found "civilian"
status by a victim's exact situation, rather than military status. A
definition of "terrorism" articulates the following general principle:
"the individual victim is victimized because of his membership of a
civilian population targeted by the accused.""25
f. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
It is obvious that the attacks directed at the WTC and the Pentagon
targeted a "civilian population," more precisely, the population of
New York City and Washington, D.C. 252 As a result, over 3000
citizens perished, mostly civilians.253 Hence, the targeted population
included civilian and non-civilian members but was predominantly
civilian in nature.' Furthermore, given the sufficient number of
individuals targeted in the attack, the attacks were clearly aimed at a
43, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 574-76 & 582
(Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
para. 70 (1999); Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, para. 54 (Dec. 14
1999); Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, para. 207
(2000); Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 208-10 & 214
(Mar. 3, 2000) (reiterating the same principle in relation to determining civilian
status).
250. See Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, para. 214 (reasoning that crimes against humanity
means not only crimes against civilians in the strict sense, but also againt those
who are members of a resistance movement or who are former combatants,
whether they wear a uniform or not); see also KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at
95 (noting that, when a family member is compelled to use arms to protect the
family, he or she does not lose civilian status).
251. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 95 (highlighting the victim's point
of view in determining civilian status).
252. See Kayishema, ICTR-95-1-T, para. 127 (finding that traditionally, the
legal definitions of "civilian" or "civilian population" have been discussed within
the context of armed conflict).
253. See id. (reasoning that the term civilian must be understood within the
context of war as well as relative peace).
254. See id. (considering that a wide definition of civilian is applicable even
where there is no armed conflict, and that this broad definition includes all persons
except those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the legitimate
means to exercise force). Non-civilians would include, for example, members of
the FAR, the RPF, the police and the Gendarmerie Nationale. Id.
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population.255 The admitted purpose of the terrorists in striking at the
Pentagon and the WTC was to kill as many civilians as possible.
These attacks were clearly "directed against" a civilian population,
and the intemational community specifically denounced the attacks
on that basis. 256
g. On a Widespread or Systematic Basis
Under the Rome Statute, the crimes perpetrated must be related to
"widespread or systematic attacks" against a civilian population.257
However, the act of the accused does not necessarily have to be part
of both a "widespread" and a "systematic" attack; one type of attack
is sufficient.25 8 The Akayesu decision defined the concept of
255. See Prosecutor v. Dragoijub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic,
Case No. IT-96-23, para. 90 (June 12 2002) (holding that it is sufficient to show
that enough individuals were targeted in the course of the attack, or that they were
targeted in such a way as to show that the attack was in fact directed against a
civilian "population," rather than against a limited and randomly-selected number
of individuals).
256. See id. para. 91 (establishing that the use of the word "population" does not
denote that the entire population of the geographical entity in which the attack
takes place must have been subjected to that attack). Moreover, the criteria of
"directed against," seems to be fully satisfied in this case. Id.
257. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 271 (July 15,
1999) (rejecting the possibility that a random act of violence could qualify as a
crime against humanity). But see Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic et al., Case No. IT-95-
13-R61, para. 30 (Apr. 3, 1996) (explaining that the ICTY does not exclude the
possibility that a single act against one victim or a limited number of victims could
qualify as a Crime against humanity, and noting that the key factor is that there be
a nexus between the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population);
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 649 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting the
possibility that a single act can constitute a crime against humanity). If the effect
of the single attack is widespread in scope, the threshold would also be met.
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 206 (Mar. 3, 2000). In
this single event theory, "the act of denouncing a Jewish neighbour to the Nazi
authorities committed against the background of widespread persecution against
the Jews has been held to be a crime against humanity." KITTICHAISAREE, supra
note 56, at 97.
258. See Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1, paras. 646-47 (supporting the contention that the
use of either "widespread" or "systematic" will serve to exclude isolated or
random acts). It is relevant to point out that the ICTR was confronted with a
controversy over the French term "et," placed between the words "widespread"
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"widespread" as "massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims." '259 In contrast, it held that the "concept of
systematic may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources. "260 Finally, it concluded that "there is no
requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the policy
of a state," but that "[t]here must however be some kind of
preconceived plan or policy." '261 In sum, established international
jurisprudence equates the term "widespread attack" to an attack
directed against a multiplicity of victims, while the term "systematic
attack" amounts to an attack orchestrated by virtue of a preconceived
plan or policy. 262
and "systematic." As a result, the Tribunal was faced with a disjunctive over-
inclusive test in one language and a conjunctive under-inclusive test in another
language. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 144
(Sept. 2, 1998). Akayesu overruled the French version of the ICTR Statute by
stating that "[t]he Chamber considers that it is a prerequisite that the act must be
committed as part of a wide spread or systematic attack and not just a random act
of violence. The act can be part of a widespread or systematic attack and need not
be a part of both." Id. para. 579. The Court also followed this line of reasoning in
the cases of Rutaganda and Musema. Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR,
Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, para. 66 (1999); Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR,
Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, paras. 202-03 (2000). However, the ICTY pointed out:
that "[t]he fact still remains however that, in practice, these two criteria will often
be difficult to separate since a widespread attack targeting a large number of
victims generally relies on some form of planning or organisation." Blaskic, IT-95-
14-T, para. 207.
259. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 580; see also Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-
3, para. 67 (determining that, in order to find a widespread or systematic attack, the
actus reus must be shown); Musema, ICTR-96-13, para. 204 (holding that a
showing of "widespread" is a required element in a crime against humanity case).
260. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 580.
261. Id.
262. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T, para. 648 (July 14, 1997)
(explaining that the International Law Commission Draft Code intended the use of
the language "systematic" to exclude random acts, and the use of "large scale" to
exclude isolated acts at single victims); see also Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, para. 206
(noting that the term "widespread" may be shown through the cumulative effect of
a series of acts); Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 123 (setting forth the
authority of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute "widespread or
systematic attacks against any civilian population").
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The Rome Statute's primary shortcoming lies in its failure to
define the concept of "widespread or systematic attack. '263 Article
7(2), which defines the word "attack," blurs the distinction between
both terms as defined by the international jurisprudence that came
before.264 In rectifying this anomaly, the distinction between
"widespread" and "systematic" will inevitably turn on the degree of
organization used in mounting an attack.2 65 A determination of
"systematic" will necessarily involve a higher threshold, since
organization, coordination, and orchestration all pertain directly to
the concept of "systematicity" and constitute language closely
associated with an attack carried out on a "systematic" basis.266 Such
related concepts also inherently indicate a more thought-out, well-
regimented, and well-structured operation than does "widespread. 2
67
This interpretation applies to the current discussion, as the crimes
263. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 96 (explaining that the Rome
Statute's only stipulation is that the attack be directed against civilians).
264. See id. at 96-97 (mentioning that, despite the awkward drafting, as long as
a single attack affects the civilian population, it may qualify under this definition).
265. Id. at 97
Article 7 of the Rome Statute requires that both a widespread attack and a
systematic attack be carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack. To reconcile the provision under
Article 7 of the Rome Statute with established international jurisprudence, it
is hereby submitted that the difference between the two types of attack is one
of degree or organization of the attack. A widespread attack is proved when it
is directed against a multiplicity of victims as part of a course of conduct
involving multiple commission of acts in pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack, as in the case of the
policy of persecution of Jews under Nazi Germany. A systematic attack
shares the same elements as a widespread attack just mentioned, with the
exception that a systematic attack is orchestrated, coordinated, or organized
by a group of people so that the attack is carried out in a systematic manner.
In other words, systematicity is a higher threshold test than widespreadness
because the latter involves unorganized, uncoordinated, and unorchestrated
multiple commission of acts that somehow serve a policy to commit a crime
against humanity.
Id.
266. See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 580 (describing the concept of
widespread simply as an attack that is very serious).
267. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 96 (noting that any kind of
widespread attack will undoubtedly involve a large amount of planning and
organization).
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perpetrated by members of Al Qaeda certainly meet the more
onerous requirement of a "systematic attack." '268
h. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
As mentioned previously, the admitted purpose of the attacks of
September 1 1th was to transmit various messages, ranging from
opposition to the United States' policy of support for Israel to the
triumph of religious fanaticism. 69 Fortunately for this analysis,
earlier jurisprudence has identified a series of factors by which to
determine whether a given attack is "systematic" in character,
including
the existence of an acknowledged policy 270 targeting a particular
community, the establishment of parallel institutions meant to implement
this policy, the involvement of high-level political or military authorities,
the employment of considerable financial, military or other resources and
the scale or the repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the
violence committed against a particular civilian population.
27 1
268. See id. (determining that a systematic attack will involve an organized
plan).
269. See generally Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97
AM. POL. ScI. REv 343 (Aug. 2003) (providing useful insight into how the cadres
of an organization like Al Qaeda exert cautious and strategic directing in
orchestrating terrorist attacks), available at
http://danieldrezner.com/research/guest/Papel .pdf (last visited May 2, 2004).
270. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 653 (Oct. 2, 1995)
(explaining that no formalized policy is required and may even be inferred from
the circumstances in which the acts occur); see also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, paras. 204-05 (Mar. 3, 2000) (noting that the policy does not
have to be declared, clearly stated, or developed by the state).
271. Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, para. 53 (Dec. 14 1999).
The ICTY provides four guiding factors by which to determine the systematic
character of an attack:
the existence of a political objective, a plan pursuant to which the attack
is perpetrated or an ideology, in the broad sense of the word, that is, to
destroy, persecute or weaken a community; the perpetration of a criminal
act on a very large scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and
continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; the
preparation and use of significant public or private resources, whether
military or other; the implication of high-level political and/or military
authorities in the definition and establishment of the methodical plan.
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These factors suggest that the crimes committed by members of
the Al Qaeda network formed part of a "systematic attack. '272 This
terrorist group waged war against the United States and sustained a
notorious policy of targeting non-Muslim Westerners, labeled
"infidels," in a variety of attacks.273 Recalling the 1998 bombing of
U.S. embassies in Africa, orchestrated by Osama bin Laden,274 the
attacks of September 11 th fit the broader, systematic context of Al
Qaeda's struggle against the West. Moreover, the Al Qaeda network
is a tightly-regimented organization with cells across the globe.275
The organization also implemented military-like training camps
where young soldiers were subjected to drills and exercises in
preparation of their participation in the jihad.276 This organization
received significant logistical and financial support in perpetrating
the attacks of September 1lth.277 Nineteen terrorists conducted the
Blaslac, IT-95-14-T, para. 203.
272. See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 6-7 (supporting the opinion that Al Qaeda
carried out a systematic attack).
273. See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, paras. 551-
55 (Jan. 14, 2000) (explaining that the policy or plan does not have to be express
and will often be actively denied by the perpetrators); see also Blaskic, IT-95-14-
T, para. 204 (setting forth a series of factors that the ICTY considers relevant in
evaluating the presence of a plan). Among other factors, the Tribunal has said that
media propaganda was important and probative. Id.
274. See Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, para. 204 (noting that the ICTY uses a multitude
of factors, including historical circumstances and the scale of the violence).
275. See GUNARATNA, supra note 233, at 76 (offering an interesting depiction of
the cellular structure of Al Qaeda).
Al Qaeda's global terrorist network strictly adheres to the cellular (also
known as the cluster) model, "composed of many cells whose members do
not know one another, so that if a cell member is caught the other cells would
not be affected and work would proceed normally." Cell members never meet
in one place together; nor do they in fact know each other; nor are they
familiar with the means of communication used between the cell leader and
each of its members.
Id.
276. See id. at 70-71 (discussing Al Qaeda's training methods, which include
the distribution of a 7,000-page manual highlighting tactics of guerilla warfare and
terrorism).
277. See William F. Wechsler, Strangling the Hydra: Targeting Al-Qaeda's
Finances, in How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR 129, 129
(James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001) (describing one of Al Qaeda's
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actual hijackings, and many more took part in the operation or
directed it from afar .27  Al Qaeda committed this attack on a vast
scale, causing approximately 3,000 deaths, many injuries, and
massive destruction of property. 279  There were "multiple
commissions" of inhumane acts, pursuant to Article 7 in that the four
hijackings and approximately 3000 individual acts of murder were
all part of the same single, systematic attack.280 The organizations
planning and committing these crimes ensured the deployment of
significant human and financial resources.281 In addition, the issue of
major strengths as its sophisticated financial network and its ability to raise funds,
and noting that Al Qaeda relies on its assets, coupled with its sophisticated
fundraising system, in carrying out terrorist attacks).
Osama bin Laden is unusual for a terrorist. He did not become famous by
leading an army into battle, through personal acts of valor in combat, or by
running a local terrorist cell. Instead, bin Laden's claim to fame was his
ability to raise, manage, and move money for the Afghan armies that fought
the invading Soviet troops in the 1980s. This fact is central to understanding
the Al Qaeda organization today, for its Saudi leader still derives much of his
authority and influence from the cash he controls... Al Qaeda raises money
in four basic ways. First are its legal businesses and investments ... The
second way Al Qaeda makes money is through criminal schemes, both petty
and grand. Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of opium, and
virtually all of it comes from Taliban-controlled territory, despite the fact that
the Taliban claim to oppose drug production on religious grounds.. Al Qaeda
also solicits donations from rich Muslims who share its goals .... The fourth
and perhaps most important source of Al Qaeda's budget is the mass fund-
raising it conducts through charitable and nongovernmental organizations.
Id. at 130-32. For a general discussion on the topic of Al Qaeda's financial
network see GUNARATNA, supra note 233, at 60-62.
278. See Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist
Attack, in How DID THIS HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note
277, at 1, 2, 8 (noting that there were a total of nineteen hijackers involved in the
September 11 th attacks, all of whom were part of Osama bin Laden's network and
all of whom are believed to have been under his direction).
279. See HARRY HENDERSON, TERRORIST CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 77 (2003)
(explaining that, in addition to the destruction of the both WTC towers and a
portion of the Pentagon, the actual death toll was actually closer to 2,790).
280. See KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 96 (noting that Article 7 of the ICC
requires crimes against humanity to be widespread or systematic attacks against
civilians, not simply random acts of violence).
281. See Wechsler, supra note 277, at 130-33 (discussing Al Qaeda's fund
raising methods).
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high-level funding or involvement is two-fold. 82 On one hand, the
Al Qaeda network, heavily involved with the Taliban government
and several other high-level Muslim officials, orchestrated the
attacks. 283 On the other hand, even to this day, there is still
controversy as to those organizations or individuals responsible for
funding the operation.284 Some theories assert that Al Qaeda obtained
funding from wealthy Muslims in several countries, including Saudi
Arabia. 85
Many other factors would tend to corroborate the fact that these
actions fit the description of crimes against humanity.286 For
example, the Blaskic case indicated that courts should consider
media propaganda as probative of the "systematic" character of an
attack.287 Osama bin Laden, with the support of both the Taliban
government and Al Qaeda, released several videotapes to the media
in which he claimed responsibility for the attacks, advanced his
282. See id. (explaining the various sources of funding for Al Qaeda's terrorist
operations).
283. See Franck, supra note 242, at 66 (explaining that one of the factors in the
U.S. military's decision to intervene in Afghanistan was the fact that the Taliban
harboured and provided training facilities for terrorists).
284. See Wechsler, supra note 277, at 132 (discussing the fact that Al Qaeda
solicits donations from rich Muslims who support its ideology).
Such donations were vital to the mujahideen in their war against the Soviets
and remain an important source of income for Islamist extremists today. And
the donors are surprisingly numerous. Conventional wisdom dictates that
terrorists or their supporters are very poor and have no real options in life. But
a significant percentage of terrorists and their backers in fact come from
middle-class and wealthy families. Such is the case with bin Laden himself
and many of the September 11 th hijackers. Unfortunately, the identities of
most of the wealthy donors remain a matter of mere speculation; this area
requires further investigation.
Id.
285. See id. at 132, 141 (urging President Bush to seek the assistance of Muslim
countries in determining the source of Al Qaeda finances).
286. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 204 (Mar.
3, 2000) (discussing various additional factors to use in the course of determining
whether or not crimes against humanity have been perpetrated).
287. See id. (mentioning that courts should also consider the overall content of
the perpetrators' political program as shown through the writings and speeches of
its authors).
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views, and further threatened to terrorize the target population. 88
Various additional ,factors bear consideration as part of this
evaluation, such as the number of victims, the geographical area
covered by the attacks,289 and the organization's ability to gather
intelligence and infiltrate political establishments. 29 Based on the
factors mentioned above, the acts perpetrated by members of Al
Qaeda would seem to fully satisfy the threshold set out under the
Rome Statute and international jurisprudence.
i. The Policy or Plan Element
As mentioned previously, Article 7 of the Rome Statute requires
the presence of a policy or plan in the commission of crimes against
humanity.2 9' The relevant factors were examined in the previous
section.92 However, as established earlier, terrorist groups or
organizations such as Al Qaeda can be the perpetrators of crimes
against humanity.293 In this regard, the application of international
288. See Howard Schneider & Walter Pincus, Bin Laden Video Includes Sept.
11 Praise; 'Will' of Hyacker Mixed With Newer Footage; Al Qaeda Leader is
Silent, WASH. POST, April 16, 2002, at A12 (explaining the content of the many Al
Qaeda videotapes that have aired since the September 11 th attacks), 2002 WL
19154179. This video shows Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri praising the
September 1 Ith terrorist attacks. Id.
289. See Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, para. 204 (noting that "temporally and
geographically repeated" offensives can factor into the determination whether the
Court will classify an attack as a crime against humanity, and therefore within its
jurisdiction).
290. See GUNARATNA, supra note 233 at 76.
Contemporary terrorist groups have perfected the art of agent handling to
generate high grade or high quality intelligence. Unlike the ragtag terrorist
groups of the Cold War period, sophisticated terrorist groups of the post-Cold
War period have developed intelligence wings comparable with government
intelligence agencies. By running agents into the political establishment,
security forces or security and intelligence apparatus, Al Qaeda and Islamist
terrorist groups have infiltrated both Middle Eastern, and other governments.
Id.
291. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.
292. See supra Part II.F.4.h (discussing those factors established by the courts as
probative of whether an attack qualifies as systematic); see also KITTICHAISAREE,
supra note 56, at 97-102 (giving a complete history of the policy or plan element).
293. See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, para. 1
(Jan. 14, 2000) (charging the six with the crimes against humanity of murder,
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law has evolved beyond a state-based policies model, thereby
extending to criminal or terrorist groups.294 Therefore, it is now
plausible and acceptable that a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda,
through targeted killing of civilians, can be held responsible for
crimes against humanity.
j. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
The hierarchical structure and level of organization possessed by
Al Qaeda would seem to fulfill the policy or plan element almost
effortlessly, particularly in light of the considerations outlined
throughout this article.295
Assuming that the general requirements set forth in Article 7 of
the Rome Statute are met,296 it becomes necessary to briefly review
the requirements for the specific crime against humanity of murder.
inhumane acts, and persecution); see also Blaslac, ICTY 95-14-T, para. 7 (stating
that, aside from breaches of the Geneva Conventions and eleven violations of the
laws or customs of war, the accused was also charged with three crimes against
humanity); Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists are there? The Escalation
in so called Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1, 3 (2003)
(examining the definition of terrorism and explaining that certain acts of terrorism
may amount to crimes against humanity, giving the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute
such crimes); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in My Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime,
Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 60-62 (considering the possibility that the acts of September 11 th be
prosecuted as a crime against humanity).
294. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 98.
That a crime against humanity may be committed in pursuance of a policy of
either a State or a non-State actor is not disputed. The law regarding crimes
against humanity has developed to the extent that crimes against humanity
can be committed on behalf of entities with defacto control over a particular
territory although those entities have no international recognition or formal
status of a de jure State; it can be also committed by a terrorist group or
organization. Private individuals with the aforesaid de facto power or
organized in criminal gangs or groups might also be in the position to commit
crimes against humanity.
Id.
295. See supra Part II.F.4.i. (discussing the requirements of the policy or plan
element).
296. See supra Part II.F.4 (delineating the requirements as an attack, a nexus
between specific crimes and attack, committed against a civilian population, on a
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5. Specific Crime Against Humanity of Murder
a. Rome Statute Requirements
The specific crime against humanity of murder is identified in
Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute.197 It is important to note that
there is controversy over the use of the word meurtre in the French
version of the Rome Statute, as opposed to Article 3(a) of the French
version of the ICTR Statute and Article 5(a) of the French version of
the ICTY Statute which both use the term assassinat.2 98 The
confusion is relatively simple to resolve: assassinat contains a higher
degree of mens rea or premeditation, while the term meurtre does
not contain so high a standard of premeditation. 99 In Akayesu, the
ICTR Trial Chamber I stated that there was an error in translation in
the ICTR Statute, and offered a definition of murder."' This finding
has been rejected in other case law, leading tribunals to adopt the
higher standard of mens rea embodied in the term assassinat.0' It is
widespread or systemic basis, and involving a policy or plan element, and applying
them to the events of September 11 th).
297. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(l)(a).
298. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 588
(Sept. 2, 1998) (examining the difference between the words "murder" and
"assassinat").
299. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-
T, para. 137 (May, 21 1999) (explaining that the difference between the words
murder and assassinat derives from the fact that the English definition of "murder"
includes, but does not require, premeditation, while the French word assassinat
absolutely requires premeditation).
300. See Akayesu, supra note 298, para. 589 (discussing that customary
international law dictates that murder, and not assassinat, is considered to be a
crime against humanity). The court then defines murder and gives the elements of
murder, which are:
the victim is dead, the death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the
accused or the subordinate, and at the time of the killing, the accused or
subordinate had the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the
deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's
death, and is reckless whether death ensures or not.
Id.
301. See Kayishema, ICTR 95-1-T, para. 137 (rejecting the Akayesu
interpretation and holding that the Court's interpretation has to be bound by the
actual wording of the ICTR statute, which dictates that the crime against humanity
is assassinat and not meurtre).
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useful to note that, under the ICC, the generally-accepted standard
corresponds to the term meurtre, which does not require
premeditation.302 In fact, it seems that the ICC will be applying the
standard established in Blaskic3 °3 and other similar cases, which
upheld the reasoning of the ICTR in Akayesu.0 4
In sum, the specific crime against humanity of murder under the
Rome Statute can be defined as "the unlawful killing of a human
being as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population of which the victim is a member."3 °5 The requisite
elements of this crime of murder are as follows:
the victim is dead as a result of an unlawful act or omission of the accused
or his subordinate who, at the time of the killing intended to kill or cause
grievous bodily harm to the deceased with the knowledge that such bodily
harm was likely to cause the victim's death, and was reckless whether
death ensued or not.30 6
302. See KiTTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 102-4 (reviewing the
assassinatlmeurtre dichotomy).
303. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 216 (Mar.
3, 2000) (distinguishing between premeditated murder and non-premeditated
murder).
It is appropriate to point out first that the French version of the Statute uses
the term assassinat" - a crime with a very precise meaning in French national
law whilst the English version adopts the word "murder" which translates in
French as meurtre. Relying on Article 7(l)(a) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Article 18 of the ILC Code of Crimes Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind and the assertions of Trial Chamber I of
the ICTR in the Akayesu case which all refer to murder, the Trial Chamber is
of the view that it is murder and not premeditated murder which must be the
underlying offence of a crime against humanity.
Id.
304. See Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, para. 51 (Dec. 14
1999) (holding that the tribunal will accept that murder is the appropriate crime
against humanity, and that this interpretation is consistent with international
custom); see also Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
para. 79 (1999) (following the Akayesu definition of murder and defining murder
as the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being).
305. KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 56, at 104.
306. Id.
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From the cited passages, it is apparent that the Rome Statute does
away with the premeditation element found under the French
term assassinat.0 7
b. Application to Specific Acts of Terrorism
As previously demonstrated, the crimes perpetrated on September
1 th were part of a "systematic attack. 30 8 The threshold for the
crime of murder under the Rome Statute does not pose much of a
challenge in the case of Al Qaeda. °9 The terrorists were well aware
that their conduct would result in human deaths, and certainly
intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm at the time of the
attack. 10 In fact, they used these deaths as a means of broadcasting
messages and threats worldwide.3 1 Moreover, the terrorists likely
harbored the necessary premeditation even to fulfill the test under a
more onerous legal standard embodying the meaning of the French
307. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 589-
90 (Sept. 2, 1998) (interpreting the crime against humanity as not requiring mens
rea); see also Rutaganda, ICTR 96-3-T, para. 78-9 (explaining that customary
international law dictates that murder, and not assassinat, is a crime against
humanity).
308. See supra Part II.F.4.g (concluding that Al Qaeda's attacks were part of a
"systematic" as opposed to a widespread attack); see also Christopher L.
Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Law & Literature, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2003) (explaining that the attacks of September 11 th
were part of a systematic attack in the course of examining whether the
participants in the attack enjoy any protections under international law).
309. See Blakesley, supra note 308, at 1047 (holding that the events of
September 11 th met the requisite elements of murder in examining what course of
action the United States could take in responding to such acts under current
principles of international law); see also David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course
with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 100 n.6 (2002)
("[t]he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, would appear to meet the criteria
for crimes against humanity, in that they constituted murder that appears to have
been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population, and presumably with knowledge of the attack by the
perpetrators and their presumed conspirators.").
310. See Blakesley, supra note 308, at 1047 (explaining that at least some of the
perpetrators and their leaders knew they were, or at the very least intended to be,
part of a systematic attack on civilians, and noting that over three thousand
civilians were, in fact, killed).
311. See id. (discussing the political or religious messages that underlie acts of
terrorism).
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word assassinat.1 2 However, that question remains purely academic,
as the ICC does not require premeditation for this specific crime.
1 3
Nevertheless, it is apparent from widely-known facts that members
of Al Qaeda had been planning these attacks thoroughly and carried
them out in carefully-orchestrated fashion.314 These acts are
reminiscent of past terrorist activities, such as the bombing of U.S.
embassies in Africa, with two essential differences: the scale on
which they were perpetrated and the unparalleled death toll that
ensued.315
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the political or logistical ramifications that could
result from broadening the jurisdiction of the ICC, there are several
arguments that support such an initiative. In fact, events like those
perpetrated on September 11 th would, in my view, qualify as crimes
against humanity, pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome Statute.316 Even
should the ICC wish to apply a stringent standard in adjudicating
cases of terrorism, there is no doubt that events of this magnitude
would easily meet all of the requisite elements. In sum, such acts of
312. See id. at 1058-9 (stating that the perpetrators of the attacks of September
11 th had the requisite mens rea for murder).
313. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 588
(Sept. 2, 1998) (holding that the appropriate standard is the murder standard and
not the "assassinat" standard); see also Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-
95-10, para. 51 (Dec. 14 1999) (deciding to follow Akayesu and reject the
premeditation requirement); Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, ICTR, Case No.
ICTR-96-3-T, para. 79 (1999) (holding that premeditation is not a necessary
element of murder).
314. See Laura Taylor Swain, Liberty in the Balance: The Role of the Third
Branch in a Time of Insecurity, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 51, 51 (2004) (stating that
the September I 1th attacks were the result of long-term and sophisticated
planning).
315. See Ceremony Honors U.S. Embassy Bombing Victims, CNN, Sept. 11,
1998 ("[t]he U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were targets of twin car
bombs August 7 that killed 257 people and wounded 5,500 others, mostly
Kenyans."), http://www.cnn.com/US/9809/1 l/embassy.bomb.memorial (last
visited Mar. 28, 2004).
316. See supra Part II (suggesting that terrorism should be recognized as a crime
against humanity); see also Drumbl, supra note 293, at 60-62 (explaining that the
events of September 11 th may qualify as crimes against humanity).
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terrorism are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack. They ultimately lead to multiple acts of murder against
innocent civilians.
Some authors argue that acts of terrorism could amount to other
crimes against humanity, such as persecution.3"7 In addition, there is
a strong belief shared by many prominent jurists that these events
qualify as crimes against humanity, and that other international acts
of terrorism should not be exempted from the same legal
characterization.3"8 Consequently, the next step for the international
community could be to amend the Rome Statute pursuant to Article
121. 319 However, these changes would not enter into force
immediately. Most importantly, there would be obvious obstacles to
an amendment for reasons previously outlined, such as persistent
fears regarding the politicization of the Court.3 20 This article
concludes by suggesting that the ICC should take these factors into
consideration, and adapt Article 7 to this reality.
In this author's view, the text of the Rome Statute does not need to
be amended in order to encompass acts of terrorism. As discussed
above, most states view the crime of terrorism as containing two key
317. See Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of
Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357, 383 (2003) ("[t]errorists can be
convicted of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
and even piracy (i.e. the Achille Lauro incident), if they committed these crimes by
using terrorist methods."); see also Mary Robinson Says Establishment of
International Criminal Court Key to Fighting Terror, UN WEEKLY NEWSLETTER,
Mar. 9, 2002 (calling the events of September 11 th a war crime, which is a crime
against humanity, in discussing the importance of ratifying the ICC Statute after
the terror attacks), http://www.unic.org.in/news/2002/nl/nl9mar2OO2.htm#17 (last
visited Mar. 26, 2004).
318. See Blakesley, supra note 308, at 1055 ("[t]errorism is a crime. Some terror
tactics in war rise to the level of crimes against humanity or war crimes. The same
conduct committed against innocent civilians in peacetime would be terrorism.").
319. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121 (setting out the conditions under
which the Rome Statute may be amended).
320. See Cassese, supra note 39, at 994 (expressing the reasons why states never
granted jurisdiction over international terrorism to the ICC); see also Scheffer,
supra note 309, at 100 n.7 (explaining that another reason for opposing the
inclusion of terrorism in the ICC was that such inclusion would require the ICC to
investigate complex terrorist crimes as well as suspect states, and that this would
lead to an investigative overload in the ICC).
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elements, namely the targeting of civilians and the advancement of
some ideological or political purpose. On that basis, it is clear that
acts of international terrorism fit under the Article 7 framework.321 In
fact, both terrorism and certain Article 7 crimes share tangible
similarities: they are viewed as some of the most repugnant crimes to
humanity; they employ similar language and philosophy, i.e.
prohibiting the targeting of civilians; they depart from the classic
criminal standard of mens rea and impose a different degree of
preparation and structure; in their most irreducible form, they
constitute crimes which strike at the very core of human decency,
claim innocent lives, and devastate populations; etc.3 2
Hence, other acts of international terrorism, which do not compare
in magnitude to the events of September 11 th, yet still constitute an
affront to the principles of humanity, should be prosecuted under this
mechanism.3 23 The acceptance of such a proposition could encourage
certain countries to revisit extradition treaties and rethink their
policies on combating terrorism. It would also make it so that corrupt
governments and vitiated judicial systems' handling of terrorism
321. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 49 (stating that the events of September
l1th were crimes against humanity, specifically murder, and that they would
probably have fallen under the jurisdiction of the ICC had it existed on that date).
322. See Blakesley, supra note 308, at 1110.
Crimes against humanity and terrorism are crimes of the first order. They
represent, along with genocide, the worst we mortals do to each other; that is
to say, as I will explain more fully below, to ourselves. They are crimes of
political violence without restraint of international law or morality. One
question for this article is whether international criminal law and prosecution
can even provide a remedy. The perpetrator's motive is important: violence
against innocents to achieve a political, military, religious, or philosophical
end or to be rid of individuals or groups seen as enemies (or as at least as
folks deemed to interfere with "the good life"). Sometimes the offenses are
bred of simple racial, religious, gender, or ethnic hatred, created and
manipulated by evil leadership. The leadership usually does this to gain or
maintain power. Finally, the people against whom the crimes are committed
actually are part of the essence of the crime.
Id.
323. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 49-50 (asserting that the ICC is a very
useful tool in prosecuting future acts of international terrorism that may constitute
crimes under the ICC, and suggesting that the United States explore the utility of
the ICC because an effort to dismantle the ICC would be incompatible with the
United States' war on terrorism, given its value in prosecuting acts of terrorism).
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cases is not the last instance.324 Regardless of the direction or
measures the international community wishes to take, I believe that
Lord Denning's advice should be followed: international law must
evolve. The global reality is fairly simple: terrorism involves the
international community as a whole.325  I contend that the
interpretation of international treaties should adapt accordingly, and
that multilateral cooperation on terrorism should be increased.
Oftentimes, the financing structure and network of a given terrorist
organization reaches well above and beyond national borders.326 The
world is faced with a wave of neo-terrorism that expands on new
technologies, cyberspace, access to new weaponry, increased
networking, significant financial support, solid and efficient
324. See id. at 52 (stating that one of the reasons for a permanent international
criminal system is to eliminate the injustice and corruption that results when
national leaders participate in trials for international crimes such as terrorism, often
enjoying "virtual impunity" because their governments fail to investigate and
prosecute them). The author goes on to explain that changes in international law
which militate against this type of corruption are already visible, and that
unqualified arguments in favor of immunity via the act of state doctrine, the head
of state immunity doctrine, and the diplomatic immunity doctrine are becoming
less acceptable where leaders have participated in an international crime. Id.
325. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 51 (arguing that the world has changed,
that the international community no longer tolerates international crimes, and
suggesting that the ICC be adopted in order to eliminate past problems in dealing
with such crimes, such as the inability of certain national governments to properly
prosecute them).
326. See Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 87-88 (expressing similar
thoughts in evaluating the repercussions of financing and support for terrorism in
the national security context).
[W]e believe courts may now conclude that the support of terrorism abroad
raises a possibility of adverse repercussions on Canada's security...
International conventions must be interpreted in the light of current
conditions. It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in one
country did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001,
that approach is no longer valid. First, the global transport and money
networks that feed terrorism abroad have the potential to touch all countries,
including Canada, and to thus implicate them in the terrorist activity. Second,
terrorism itself is a world-wide phenomenon. The terrorist cause may focus
on a distant locale, but the violent acts that support it may be close at hand.
Third, preventive or precautionary state action may be justified; not only an
immediate threat but also possible future risks must be considered. Fourth,.
Canada's national security may be promoted by reciprocal cooperation
between Canada and other states in combating international terrorism
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command and financing structures, etc. I contend that the national
courts are not always suited to adjudicating such offenses, and that
an international tribunal would be an adequate forum for assessing
all of the extrinsic and intrinsic legal elements in terrorism cases.327
At this time, this question is somewhat academic, as the United
States, a significant international presence, refuses to ratify the Rome
Statute.328 My proposal might attract approval among states faced
with daily acts of terrorism, but might fail to convince major
participants in the war on terror, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia to embrace the Court. The American
and British governments have been detaining suspected terrorists
indefinitely3 29 in their efforts to combat international terrorism.330
327. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 49 (suggesting that the ICC would be a
formidable venue in which to prosecute future acts of terrorism that may qualify as
crimes against humanity).
328. See id. at 98-100 (examining the U.S. position towards the ICC, and
suggesting several steps the United States could take to alleviate its concerns, such
as remaining engaged in the U.N. Preparatory Commission in order to ensure U.S.
interests remain protected, amending the Federal Criminal Code and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice in order to ensure such crimes can be prosecuted
domestically, and signing Article 98(2) agreements with governments in order to
protect U.S. personnel from having to surrender to the ICC).
As Ambassador Scheffer's remarks reflect, the U.S. government's principal
criticism of the Rome Statute is that nationals of non-States Parties can
theoretically be prosecuted before the ICC. By virtue of Article 12 of the
Statute, when an investigation has been triggered by either the Prosecutor or a
State Party, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction only if at least one of the
following States is a Party to the Rome Statute or has accepted the Court's
jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question: 1) the State in whose
territory the crime occurred, and 2) the State of which the accused is a
national. Theoretically, then, a national of a non-State Party alleged to have
committed a crime within the territorial jurisdiction of a State Party could be
prosecuted before the Court.
Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489, 490 (1999).
329. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (4th Cir. 2002)
(dealing with the restriction of access to deportation hearings in special interest
cases, but addressing the restriction of certain liberties in the fight against terror).
The government argued that the restriction of certain liberties in the fight against
terror is "akin to the construction of a mosaic," each individual piece of
information being important. Id. The level of threat a detainee poses to United
States interests, the amount of intelligence a detainee might be able to provide, the
conditions under which the detainee may be willing to cooperate, and the
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Given the tactical and strategic advantages of such a practice, it is
unlikely that the United States or the United Kingdom would
concede jurisdiction over terrorism to the ICC and, consequently,
relinquish custody over suspected terrorists.33
Nevertheless, ICC jurisdiction over terrorism undoubtedly
constitutes a feasible solution to the five jurisdictional problems I
identified at the beginning of this account. In light of ongoing
criticism of government action, my proposal offers an alternate
framework to national systems of checks and balances on executive
decision-making, while appreciating the context of a war that is
novel and indeterminate in character. It logically follows that having
an international mechanism like the ICC is ideal for upholding the
principles of international law, as long as it does not lead to the
politicization of the Court.33 It must adjudicate infractions while
disruption visits from family members and lawyers might cause have traditionally
been left to the exclusive discretion of the Executive Branch, and there they should
remain); see also A, X and Y and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 (deciding to detain alleged terrorists based
on the logic of immigration, and for practical reasons). Although the suspects were
subject to deportation, the state withheld their expulsion; the government rendered
the authority to detain subordinate to the authority to expel aliens from the country.
Id. Furthermore, the most important reason for the existence of such a policy is
easily identified: indefinite and incommunicado detention is an effective tool with
which to break cases and gather intelligence. Id.; see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256
F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (evaluating the detention of an individual
with alleged terrorist ties, and examining the U.S. government's argument that
mandatory detention without access to counsel or outside contact amounts to an
effective means of interrogation).
330. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L.
REv. 373, 414 (noting that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has orders
to subject asylum seekers from all nations where Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda
sympathizers, or other terrorist groups are known to have operated in, to
mandatory detention as part of "Operation Liberty Shield" ).
331. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 100 n.7 (explaining that the United States
has expressed strong objections against including terrorism as a crime against
humanity under the ICC because, among other things, the United States believes
that granting jurisdiction to the ICC over acts of terrorism would hamper and
undermine national and transnational efforts in fighting terror).
332. See supra Part I.B (noting that fear of politicization was one of the reasons
why terrorism was excluded from the category of crimes against humanity under
the ICC).
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keeping in mind its practical underpinnings: deterrence, punishment
of international crimes, and justice for the victims.333
333. See Scheffer, supra note 309, at 50 (explaining that the purpose behind the
ICC is to provide enforcement and deterrence against the commission of further
heinous crimes).
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